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PREDATORY PRICING THEORY
APPLIED: THE CASE OF
SUPERMARKETS VS.
WAREHOUSE STORES
Richard Craswell*
Dr. Mark R. Fratrik**
Many theories developed to analyze predatory pricing have tried to develop legal
standards that would apply to all industries. The authors of this Article reject that
approach and focus on detecting predatory pricing in one particular industry--the
retail food industry. The issue ofpredatory pricing has taken on added importance in
the retail food industry as conventional supermarkets face pricing decisions upon the
entrance into the market of low-cost warehouse stores.
The Article begins by analyzing a conventional store's competitive response to en-
try into the market of a warehouse store. The authors then discuss cost-based stan-
dards for detecting predatory pricing in the retail food industry, and conclude that
predatory pricing should not be an antitrust concern in this industry.
INTRODUCTION
LITTLE REMAINS TO be said about predatory pricing as a gen-
eral issue. The recent avalanche of legal and economic writings
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on predation has more than adequately covered our present knowl-
edge of the subject.'
One of the hallmarks of this extensive literature, though, is that
it is almost all addressed to predatory pricing as a general issue.
Most of the recent writings have focused on developing a legal stan-
dard that could be applied to every predatory pricing case.2 With
the issue framed so broadly, it is not surprising that the literature
has not produced a consensus as to an appropriate legal rule. As
most commentators now recognize, any single legal standard, espe-
cially a standard sufficiently simple to be manageable by courts and
juries, is almost certain to be too restrictive in some contexts and
too permissive in others.3 The desirability of any particular legal
rule thus depends on the relative frequency of each kind of error, a
judgment that is difficult to make in the absence of dispositive em-
pirical evidence. For example, authors who view predatory pricing
as being extremely rare take a very different view from those who
believe it to be a more common problem.4
This Article takes a much narrower approach to the predatory
pricing issue. Rather than trying to decide what rule would best fit
all predatory pricing cases, our goal is to suggest a rule that would
best fit one particular class of cases. As Professors Brodley and Hay
recently stated, "the best way to understand the impact of the vari-
ous economic theories and rules is to examine their application in a
specific factual setting."'
1. For the leading articles in the development of this literature see McGee, Predatory
Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & ECON. 137 (1958); Areeda & Turner,
Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 697 (1975). Other writings on the subject, too numerous to mention here, will be cited
where appropriate. For a thorough review of the literature see Calvani & Lynch, Predatory
Pricing Under the Robinson-Patman and Sherman Acts: An Introduction, 51 ANTrrRUST L.J.
375 (1982).
2. The principal exception, which is closest in purpose to the present article, is
Schmalansee, On the Use of Economic Models in Antitrust: The Realemon Case, 127 U. PA.
L. REV. 994 (1979).
3. Schmalansee, On the Use of Economic Models in Antitrust: The Realemon Case, 127
U. PA. L. REV. 994, 1028 (1979) ("we do not possess any simple yet universally applicable
rules for predatory pricing"). For more detailed discussions of this problem see Joskow &
Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE L.J. 213 (1979); Brodley
& Hay, Predatory Pricing: Competing Economic Theories and the Evolution of Legal Stan-
dards, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 738 (1981).
4. Compare, Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHL L.
REV. 263 (1981) (viewing predatory pricing as rare or nonexistent) with Zerbe & Cooper, An
Empirical and Theoretical Comparison of Alternative Predation Rules, 61 TEX. L. REV. 655
(1982) (viewing predatory pricing as more plausible and therefore proposing more stringent
prohibitions).
5. Brodley & Hay, supra note 3, at 772. This article responds to those authors' call for
[Vol. 36:1
PREDATORY PRICING THEORY
The class of cases considered here involves price cuts by conven-
tional supermarkets in response to the entry of lower-priced ware-
house stores. As warehouse stores have appeared in more markets,
price wars between supermarkets and warehouse stores have be-
come increasingly common, leading to a number of private anti-
trust suits.6 These price wars have also led to the introduction of
protective legislation in Congress and demands for government an-
titrust agencies to intervene.7 Governmental restrictions on super-
market price-cutting have also been supported by some
economists." However, the only governmental action to date has
been the termination of a 1957 consent decree barring Safeway from
using "below cost" or "unreasonably low" prices.9
Section I of this Article briefly surveys the various legal stan-
dards proposed in the predatory pricing literature and provides
some background information about the retail grocery industry.10
an inductive or common law approach, with a "renewed emphasis on the values and insights"
of case-by-case adjudication. Id. at 794.
6. See Handy Andy Sues H.E.B. In "Predatory Pricing" Case, SUPERMARKET NEWS,
June 21, 1982, at 1; Zone Pricing Prompts "Predator" Charge, CHAIN STORE
AGE/SUPERMARKETS, March 1982, at 16; Two Colo. Rivals Move War to Court, SUPERMAR-
KET NEws, Dec. 12, 1983, at 8. Predatory pricing charges have also arisen between compet-
ing conventional supermarkets. See Lormar Inc. v. Kroger Co., 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
62,498 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
7. H.R. REP. No. 5237, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (introduced by Rep. Markey); Bill
Seeks to Strengthen Law on Predatory Pricing, SUPERMARKET NEws, April 9, 1984, at 1;
Predatory Pricing Charges Hold NGA Parley Spotlight, SUPERMARKET NEws, Jan. 30, 1984,
at 2; FTC Held to be Abandoning Small Retailer, Wholesaler, SUPERMARKET NEws, March
7, 1983, at 1; NGA Voices Concern Over Safeway Price Decree End, SUPERMARKET NE\vS,
Nov. 21, 1983, at 1; Remarks by Ronald A. Bloch entitled, "Predatory Pricing in the Retail
Grocery Industry," before the Conference on Warehouse Retailing, Atlanta, Georgia (Dec.
16, 1981).
8. B. MARION, W. MUELLER, R. COTTERILL, F. GEITHMAN & J. SCHMELZER, THE
FOOD RETAILING INDUSTRY: MARKET STRUCTURE, PROFITS, AND PRICES 143-44 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as MARION]; F. Allvine, Report on Chain Store Pricing Practices for the
Greater Atlanta Area Carried Out for the Week Ending 3/29/81 (unpublished manuscript)
[hereinafter cited as Allvine]. The Allvine study is directly concerned with price cuts by
conventional supermarkets in response to the entry of warehouse stores. The MARION study
was written before the growth of warehouse stores, and therefore focused on price cuts in
response to the entry of conventional supermarkets.
9. United States v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 1957 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,871 (N.D. Tex.
1957). The Justice Department's decision and the court's subsequent termination of the con-
sent decree are reported in 45 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 973 (Dec. 15, 1983).
For some industry views see NGA Voices Concern Over Safeway Price Decree End, SUPER-
MARKET NEWS, Sept. 12, 1983, at 1. The Federal Trade Commission recently held a series of
public hearings on this issue as an alternative to prosecuting alleged instances of predation by
supermarkets. See FTC Will Hold Hearings on Retailer Competition, SUPERMARKET NEWS,
Apr. 2, 1984, at I; FTC Will Investigate Effect of No-Frills Grocery Stores on Retail Pricing
Activity, 45 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 1234 (June 28, 1984).
10. See infra notes 16-37 and accompanying text.
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Section II develops an economic theory of how nonpredatory super-
markets would respond to the entry of a warehouse store.I1 Section
III examines the difficulties of designing a legal standard that would
prohibit predation without deterring these nonpredatory price
cuts.12 Section IV reviews economic theories that explain why su-
permarkets might engage in injurious, predatory price cuts, and ar-
gues that such tactics are likely to be infrequent. 13
In light of the slim chance of injurious predation, and the high
risk of deterring competitive price cuts, we conclude that price
wars in the retail grocery business should not give rise to antitrust
violations regardless of how low prices fall. 4 Our analysis thus
supports either a blanket rule of per se legality for all price-cutting
or the Joskow-Klevorick proposal for per se legality in markets
whose structure is not conducive to monopolization.15 Obviously,
one case study cannot establish that either of these rules is appropri-
ate in any other market, much less that they should be adopted as a
universal standard for all predation cases. Our aim is to stimulate
enough case studies of other industries, so that we will eventually
build-up enough knowledge about the possible legal rules to be able
to answer these larger questions.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Predatory Pricing Literature
Predatory pricing is usually said to involve price cuts adopted in
order to drive a competitor out of business in the hope of earning
higher profits after the competitor has been eliminated.16 However,
there is no consensus as to the exact definition of predatory pricing,
and at least five kinds of legal standards have been proposed.7
The first group consists of proposals that price cuts should be
11. See infra notes 38-71 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 72-98 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 99-130 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
15. See Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 3. A blanket rule of per se legality for all price
cuts and the Joskow & Klevorick proposal differ only in their treatment of markets whose
structure is conducive to monopolization by predatory price-cutting. This Article concludes
that the retail grocery industry does not fit that description, our analysis provides no basis for
choosing between these two rules.
16. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 1, at 697; Zerbe & Cooper, supra note 4, at 657-58;
Yamey, Predatory Price Cutting: Notes & Comments, 15 J.L. & EcON. 129, 129 (1972).
17. A sixth category consists of authors who urge stricter enforcement against predatory
pricing, but do not attempt to define any standard for distinguishing predatory price cuts
from competitive ones. The study by MARION falls into this category. MARION, supra note
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illegal only if they result in a price below some measure of the de-
fendant's costs. The most famous proposal, that of Professors
Areeda and Turner, would prohibit pricing below the defendant's
average variable costs. 8 This proposal has gained widespread ac-
ceptance in federal courts, although most courts treat the variable
cost threshold as establishing a presumption of guilt or innocence
rather than as an absolute rule. 19 Other commentators have pro-
posed standards based on some other measure of costs, such as av-
erage total costs20 or long-run incremental costs.2"
The second group consists of proposals that predatory pricing
should never be an antitrust violation. 2 While this view has not
been adopted by any court, commentators supporting this position
urge a rule of per se legality for all price cuts.
The third proposal combines aspects of the first two categories.
Professors Joskow and Klevorick recommend a "two-tier" ap-
proach in which courts examine the market's structural characteris-
tics, such as barriers to entry and concentration levels, in order to
determine whether long-term market power is a serious possibil-
ity.23 If not, the case would be dismissed. If so, the court would
proceed to judge the price cuts under some form of price-cost com-
parison." While this approach has not been explicitly adopted by
any court, several courts have replicated its most important feature,
avoiding price-cost comparisons in markets not conducive to mo-
nopolization by dismissing attempted monopolization charges when
18. Areeda & Turner, supra note 1. The authors' subsequent modifications and defenses
of this standard are found in 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW J 711-21
(1976). See also Areeda & Turner, Scherer on Predatory Pricing: A Reply, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 891 (1976); Areeda & Turner, Williamson on Predatory Pricing, 87 YALE L.J. 1337
(1978); Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing: A Rejoinder, 88 YALE L.J. 1641 (1979); P.
AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 114-61 (Supp. 1982).
19. For a thorough survey of the recent case law as it relates to the theoretical literature
see Hurwitz & Kovacic, Judicial Analysis of Predation: The Emerging Trends, 35 VAND. L.
REV. 63 (1982).
20. Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 3; Zerbe & Cooper, supra note 4 (endorsing total
cost standards in certain markets). See also Ordover & Willig, An Economic Definition of
Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8 (1981) (proposing various cost-
based standards).
21. R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 184-96 (1976). The
difference between these various kinds of costs is analyzed in Sections II and III of this
Article.
22. Easterbrook, supra note 4; R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT
WAR WITH ITSELF 144-60 (1978); McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. & ECON. 289
0980).
23. Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 3.
24. See also Ordover & Willig, supra note 20, at 12 n.17 (who also support a two-tiered
approach).
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the defendant lacks a "dangerous probability of success.",2 5
The fourth category of proposals consists of dynamic standards
which focus on the way the defendant's conduct changes in re-
sponse to entry. For example, Professor Williamson has suggested
that defendants not be allowed to increase output in response to
entry,2 6 while Professor Baumol proposes that defendants be al-
lowed to reduce prices if they do not raise them for a period of
several years after an entrant exits the market.2' Neither of these
proposals has been adopted by any court.
The final category consists of proposals that courts adopt a "rule
of reason" approach, examining all relevant factors that bear on the
long-run efficiency of the defendant's pricing behavior.2" While this
approach was endorsed by Professor Scherer, it too has not been
adopted by any court.
B. The Retail Grocery Market
The retail food industry is currently in a state of flux. The de-
cline in population growth has affected the number of consumers
shopping for food. Other economic changes have affected the way
in which consumers shop, including an increase in the business
done by fast food restaurants and the extent to which consumers are
concerned about prices as opposed to other aspects of service.29
Grocery retailers have responded to these changes with major struc-
tural shifts, including an increased use of formats ranging from gi-
ant "superstores" to limited-assortment "7-Eleven" operations to
the no-frills "box" or "warehouse" stores.
Warehouse stores are a relatively new, but rapidly growing phe-
nomenon.30 They offer virtually no services or amenities and only a
25. E.g., Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255, 270-72 (7th Cir. 1981); Cliff
Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203, 206-08 (5th Cir. 1969); In re General Foods
Corp., 103 F.T.C. 204, 322-25 (1984).
26. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 248
(1977); Williamson, Williamson on Predatory Pricing I, 88 YALE L.J. 1183 (1979).
27. Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of Predatory
Pricing, 89 YALE L.J. 1 (1979). See Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 3, at 255 (who also
would take the permanence of the price cut into account if the market structure was condu-
cive to monopolization).
28. Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARV. L. REV.
869 (1976); Scherer, Some Last Words on Predatory Pricing, 89 HARV. L. REV. 901 (1976).
29. See Bloom, The Future of the Retail Food Industry: Another View, 54 J. RETAILING
3 (Winter 1976); Williams, A Policy-Oriented Typology of Grocery Shoppers, 54 J. RETAILING
27 (Spring 1978).
30. A 1980 study estimated that warehouse stores accounted for only one-half of one
percent of the nation's grocery sales. Markets React with Vigor to Box Store Competition,
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limited range of products. Items are often displayed in their origi-
nal shipping crates, and customers often must bag their own
items.3 The resulting savings are passed on to consumers in the
form of prices that are about ten percent lower than prices of con-
ventional supermarkets.3 2 Many warehouse stores are run by small,
independent firms, but large retail chains such as Jewel and Food
Giant have also established warehouse outlets.33
Antitrust concerns arise from the response of conventional su-
permarkets to the entry of warehouse stores. While some super-
markets have responded by increasing the quality of their services,
the most common response has been to reduce prices. Supermar-
ket chains often cut prices only in the stores closest to the new
warehouse store, a response known as "zone pricing.",34 In some
markets the warehouse stores continued to grow anyway. In Green
Bay, warehouse stores captured thirty-three percent of the market
within six months of their entry,35 and in Kansas City their market
share is estimated at over fifty percent.36 In other markets, how-
ever, the supermarket price wars have forced the warehouse stores
out of business or have caused the warehouse stores to abandon
plans for expansion into neighboring markets. As a result, ware-
house stores have attacked the price cuts by conventional supermar-
kets as being predatory. Private antitrust suits have been filed in
SUPERMARKET NEWS, April 28, 1980, at 4. The total number of warehouse stores has grown
from an estimated 150 in 1978 to 1,600 in 1981, 2,200 in 1982, 3,000 in 1984, and a projected
4,000 by the end of 1985. Inventory of Formats: Capsule Report Updates Status of Grocery
Stores From Box to Super, ADVERTISING AGE, Apr. 27, 1981, at S-2; Success is Seen Limiting
Super Warehouse Stores, SUPERMARKET NEWS, May 16, 1983, at 1; Upgrading is Predicted
for Warehouse Store Format, SUPERMARKET NEWS, Mar. 12, 1984, at 28.
31. For a description of some of the specific cost-saving technologies used by warehouse
stores see Bishop & Murphy, Warehouse Markets, 14 J. FOOD DISTRIBUTION 45 (Feb. 1983).
32. See Inventory of Formatls Capsule Reports Update Status of Grocery Stores from Box
to Super, ADVERTISING AGE, Apr. 27, 1981, at S-2.
33. Study Finds Execs Gloomy About Everything but Profits, SUPERMARKET NEWS, Feb.
4, 1980, at 16. In addition, at least one chain of "super warehouse stores" has already been
formed. These stores are larger than the usual warehouse store, they draw buyers from a
much larger area, and they carry some products, such as bakery goods, not usually found in
warehouse stores. Success is Seen Limiting the Growth of Super Warehouse Stores, SUPER-
MARKET NEWS, May 16, 1983, at 1.
34. See, eg., Allvine, supra note 8; Competing for Shoppers, Washington Post, July 17,
1980, at El, col. 1.
35. Depot Stores Gaining but Conventional Stores Still Viable, SUPERMARKET NEWS,
July 25, 1983, at 1.
36. Two Super Depot Stores Open Doors in Kansas City, SUPERMARKET NEWS, Aug. 29,
1983, at 26; Supermarkets, Depot Units Battle in KC., SUPERMARKET NEWS, Jan. 17, 1983,
at 4.
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several markets.37
II. COMPETITIVE RESPONSES To ENTRY
Theoretical reasons why supermarkets might want to engage in
predatory pricing are discussed in Section IV. However, the theory
that the supermarkets' price cuts are predatory is only one possible
explanation. The major alternative that must be considered is the
possibility that the price cuts are normal competitive behavior.
This Section will set forth more precisely what the phrase "normal
competitive behavior" should mean, and what might be observed if
the supermarkets' pricing is in fact competitive.
This issue is often given short shrift in the predation literature.
Most analysts begin by assuming the existence of a monopolist, or
at least a dominant firm, and attempt to devise tests to distinguish
between legitimate and predatory tactics by the monopolist. 38 In
the real world, though, monopolists are not labeled this clearly.
Even a highly concentrated retail grocery market, such as one with
four firms accounting for eighty percent of sales, 39 is not so concen-
trated that competitive behavior can be ruled out a priori. Thus,
any legal standard will have to distinguish cases of predatory pric-
ing not merely from the legitimate pricing responses of a firm with
market power, but also from the legitimate pricing responses of
competitive firms.
A. The Competitive Response To Entry
Consider a market which is served by a handful of conventional
supermarkets behaving competitively in the sense that each takes
the others' price and output decisions as given. In economic theory,
competitive markets are either perfectly competitive or monopolisti-
cally competitive.' Perfect competition exists when each store is
identical and can sell as much as it wants at the prevailing market
price, but will sell nothing if it charges even slightly above that
price. Under monopolistic competition, stores cannot sell an unlim-
ited quantity at any price, and as they raise their price their sales
37. See supra notes 6-7.
38. See, e.g., Scherer, supra note 21, at 869; Williamson, supra note 19, at 286; Baumol,
supra note 18, at 4 n. 11.
39. According to a 1977 census of business data, only six metropolitan areas in the
country had a concentration ratio this high. In 1972, only two metropolitan areas were this
concentrated. MARION, supra note 8, at 212-20.
40. See generally F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 14-24 (2d ed. 1980).
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decline but do not fall to zero. These stores cannot use this power
over price to earn supracompetitive profits, however, because under
monopolistic competition free entry will cause the number of stores
to increase until each store makes only enough sales to cover its
costs (including a normal competitive profit).41
The monopolistic competition model seems to describe retail
grocery markets more accurately. Nonprice differences among su-
permarkets, such as different locations, make it unlikely that any
single supermarket can make unlimited sales by charging prices
only slightly below its rivals, or that its sales would fall to zero with
only a slight increase in price.42 Thus, if retail grocery markets be-
have competitively, they probably behave more like monopolistic
competitors than perfect competitors. At any rate, our conclusions
are stronger if a retail grocery market is instead perfectly competi-
tive,43 so we will adopt the less favorable assumption of monopolis-
tic competition.
Assuming monopolistic competition, the equilibrium position
for a representative store will be that shown in Figure 1. The store
will sell a quantity Q1 at the price P1.' At that price, the store will
earn just enough to cover the average total costs (ATC) associated
with that level of operation, and therefore will not earn any excess
profits. If the store's demand curve (the line marked D) were far-
ther to the right, so that the store could charge a price above its
total costs at some levels of operation, the resulting profits would
eventually attract new stores into the market. The increased
number of stores would automatically reduce the sales the existing
41. As used hereafter, the term "costs" will include a normal competitive rate of return
on capital.
42. Grocery markets might also be monopolistically competitive because of the difficul-
ties buyers face in attempting to compare overall price levels at competing supermarkets. See
generally Salop & Stiglitz, Bargains and Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolistically Competitive
Price Dispersion, 44 REv. ECON. STUD. 493 (1977); Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Informa-
tion, Monopolistic Competition, and Public Policy, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (May 1982) (papers
and proceedings) (all analyzing the conditions under which imperfect information can lead to
monopolistic competition).
For studies of consumer information about prices at competing supermarkets see Devine
& Marion, The Influence of Consumer Information on Retail Pricing and Consumer Behavior,
61 AM. J. AGRICULTURAL ECON. 228 (1979); McCracken, Boynton & Blake, The Impact of
Comparative Food Price Information on Consumers and Grocery Retailers: Some Preliminary
Findings of a Field Experiment, 16 J. CONSUMER AFFAIRS 224 (1982).
43. See infra notes 62-64, 92.
44. Both graphs have been drawn and the discussion in this Section will proceed on the
assumption that the store is only selling a single product at a single price. This is obviously a
gross oversimplification. As a result, the major focus of Section III is the extension of this
analysis to a multiproduct retail operation.
1985]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
FIGURE
ATC
MC
QUANTITY
stores could make and thus shift the demand curves of existing
stores to the left. When the demand curve reaches the position
shown in Figure 1, existing stores would no longer earn excess prof-
its, so the inducement for entry disappears and the market would be
in equilibrium.45
Before proceeding, we should point out that the market being
considered here is the local neighborhood or zone in which the re-
tail grocery stores compete. This market may not be an appropriate
market for measuring a dominant store's market power because
grocery store chains operating elsewhere in a metropolitan area
often can easily expand into neighborhoods they do not currently
serve. However, our concern here has nothing to do with making
an assessment of market power. Our goal in this Section is to ex-
amine the pricing decisions of hypothetical competitive stores, so it
45. Figure 1 depicts the position of a marginal store that barely finds it profitable to
operate in this market. A store that for some reason has either lower costs or higher demand
than the marginal entrant might earn greater profits, which would represent a return on its
unique cost or demand advantage.
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is appropriate to focus on the neighborhood where prices are actu-
ally affected by the warehouse store.46
1. The Initial Price Cut
Assume now that a new warehouse store is opened in the neigh-
borhood. If the existing supermarkets were of just the right size to
serve this neighborhood, the addition of the warehouse store will
create a condition of excess capacity.47 For example, if the amount
of groceries sold before entry had been just enough to support four
efficient-sized conventional supermarkets earning a normal compet-
itive rate of return, the market probably will not be large enough to
support the same four supermarkets plus a new, efficient-sized ware-
house store. The total demand for groceries in the market is more
or less fixed, and it is extremely unlikely that the stores will be able
to stimulate enough new demand to fill the new capacity.
Consequently, the entrance of the warehouse store will leave the
conventional store with fewer sales at any given price. If the con-
ventional store continues to charge the pre-entry price P1 it will
lose business, and if it does less business then its average costs will
rise. As Figure 1 shows, the pre-entry price P1 will not be enough
to cover the store's average total costs at any quantity less than Q1,
so the conventional store will be operating at a loss if it continues to
charge P 1.
How would a competitive supermarket react to this loss of busi-
ness? In the short-run, while capacity is fixed,48 a competitive store
should select the price which minimizes its total losses, taking its
competitors' prices as given. Thus, it should not try to raise prices
because if it does, and its competitors' prices remain the same, it
46. An outside supermarket will never enter this local market as long as the local mar-
ket remains competitive, because the occasion for such entry will never arise. The ability of
consumers within the local area to shop at outside stores must be considered, but this is
simply one of the factors that determines the slope of the demand curve for groceries within
this local neighborhood.
47. The term "excess capacity" is used here to mean more stores than the market can
sustain in a long-run equilibrium, with each store earning a competitive rate of return. In a
different sense of the term, monopolistically competitive markets always entail excess capac-
ity because no firm makes enough sales to permit it to operate at the lowest point on its
average total cost curve. See Figures 1 and 2. However, this form of "excess capacity" does
not destroy the stability of the monopolistically competitive equilibrium, nor does it indicate
that society would necessarily be better off if that "excess" were eliminated by removing some
of the firms from the market. See infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
48. The short-run is usually defined as the period of time in which the stores cannot
easily adjust capacity by laying off some employees, by moving to a smaller building, or even
by closing an entire store. Possible adjustments to capacity which the stores might make over
the longer-run are the subject of subsection 2.
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will lose even more sales and suffer even greater losses. Instead, a
store attempting to minimize its losses should lower prices to in-
crease its sales until the marginal cost (MC) of an additional sale
equals the marginal revenues (MR) the store receives from that sale.
The only exception to this principle is that a competitive store
should stop selling if the price falls so low that it would be more
profitable to close the store entirely. This "shut down price" is usu-
ally considered to be the firm's average variable costs (AVC).4 9
Even in the short-run, a firm can usually save at least some of its
costs by closing its doors entirely. If the costs that could be saved
by closing down are greater than the revenues that could be earned
by staying open, then a competitive loss-minimizing store should
close down.
Thus, the initial reaction of a competitive supermarket upon the
entry of a warehouse store should either be to reduce its prices to
the point where marginal cost equals the marginal revenue associ-
ated with the new demand curve (D2) or to cease operations en-
tirely. Figure 2 shows an equilibrium in which prices have been
driven down to the store's average variable costs curve. The pre-
entry equilibrium of Figure 1 is represented by dotted lines. Prices
will not be driven below that level, because if they were, one or
more of the established stores would find it more profitable to shut
down, thereby increasing the sales available to the remaining
stores.50
2. The "Shake-out" Period
While Figure 2 describes a conventional store's short-run reac-
tion to the entry of a warehouse store, the situation cannot be a
long-run equilibrium. The price P2 is insufficient to cover the
store's average total costs at the quantity Q2 sold. Therefore, the
store will lose money. In the short-run, the store will lose money
regardless of what it does because of its fixed costs and the excess
capacity created by the entry of the warehouse store. But when it is
time to reinvest in those fixed costs (for example, when the store
must decide whether to replace its equipment or renew its lease), it
49. A more accurate label would be "average recoverable costs." This issue is addressed
in more detail in Section III.
50. Prices will not fall as far as the average variable costs if the quantity of sales
siphoned off by the warehouse store is not very large. In such a case, the new equilibrium will
be reached when marginal revenue equals marginal cost at a price above the average variable
costs, in the range between Q1 and Q2. However, even if this occurs, it would not change our
analysis significantly, so the remainder of the Article will consider only the equilibrium
shown in Figure 2.
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FIGURE
QUANTITY
will not make that investment unless it can cover total costs.
51
At this point, disinvestment will occur and the market's excess
capacity will therefore be reduced. Some stores may leave the mar-
ket while others may restructure their operations on a smaller scale,
but in either event, the market's overall capacity will be reduced.
Each reduction in capacity will leave more sales available for the
remaining stores. That is, their demand curves will shift to the
right, thus permitting them to raise their prices again. This pattern
of disinvestment followed by price increases will continue until the
price has risen to a level equal to the average total costs of the re-
maining stores. At this point, the stores will no longer be losing
money, so no further disinvestment will occur.
51. Another way to approach this problem is to recognize that the classification of a
store's costs as fixed or variable depends on the unit of time being considered. In the extreme
short-run, such as a few days, very few costs can be varied, and a firm would be willing to
price very low for those few days in order to make any contributions toward covering its fixed
costs. As the length of the price war increases, however, more costs will become variable. In
the extreme long-run, virtually all costs are variable, so average total costs equal average
variable costs. See infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
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This process is the classic method by which a competitive mar-
ket adjusts from one equilibrium to another.52 The entry of a new
competitor produces excess capacity, causing an initial drop in price
which imposes short-term losses on all firms. Eventually, some
firms are either forced out of the market or forced to readjust their
capacity, and the price then rises to a level which allows the remain-
ing firms to cover their total costs. The same process would be ob-
served if the excess capacity had been created by the entry of
another conventional supermarket, or by a decline in demand due
to population shifts out of the market area.
The difficulty is that most of these effects-a decline in prices,
followed by the exit of some stores, followed by an increase in
prices-would also be observed in any case of truly predatory pric-
ing. This will become more apparent when we examine the effects
of the competitive process on the entering warehouse store, a task to
which we now turn.
B. The Effect on the Entrant
1. The Effect on the Entrant's Short-term Profits
The previous Section explained how the entry of the warehouse
store and the resulting excess capacity would force conventional
store prices down to P2 in Figure 2. However, these price cuts by
the conventional stores will attract customers away from the ware-
house store, thus making the warehouse store less profitable.
The exact effect of the price cuts on the warehouse store's profits
will depend in part on the warehouse store's cost structure relative
to the cost structure of the conventional stores. Assuming that the
warehouse store is less costly to operate than a conventional store,
any short-term losses suffered by the warehouse store will probably
be less than those suffered by the conventional stores.5" In fact, if
the warehouse store's average total costs are below the conventional
stores' average variable costs, the warehouse store could still earn a
profit during the price war even if price is driven down to the con-
52. The traditional focus of microeconomic theory has been the prediction of equilib-
rium behavior rather than the paths by which markets move from one equilibrium to another.
See T. KOOPMANS, THREE ESSAYS ON THE STATE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE (1957); F.
FISHER, DISEQUILIBRIUM FOUNDATIONS OF EQUILIBRIUM ECONOMICS (1982). Therefore,
one of the difficulties in analyzing predatory pricing is that it is inherently a disequilibrium
phenomenon.
53. This may not always be the case. The warehouse store will probably also have to
charge a lower price than the conventional stores. If the difference in price exceeds the differ-
ence in costs, the warehouse store's losses could exceed the conventional store's losses.
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ventional stores' average variable costs. If the warehouse store's
average total costs are above the conventional stores' variable costs,
however, the warehouse store will suffer short-term losses during
this period of excess capacity.
2. The Effect on Entry and Exit Decisions
Part A of this Section described how the conventional stores
eventually reduced their capacity or exited from the market after
prices fell following the warehouse store's entry. If the price war
causes the warehouse store to suffer short-term losses, the ware-
house store will have to make a similar decision about whether to
disinvest. Short-term losses will not cause the warehouse store to
exit immediately (just as they did not induce the conventional stores
to exit as soon as prices fell), as long as the warehouse store is earn-
ing enough to cover its variable costs. However, when the time
comes for the warehouse store to reinvest its fixed costs (for exam-
ple, when its lease comes up for renewal), it will not make that in-
vestment unless it can expect to recoup those costs at some time in
the future. The warehouse store will balance the profits that it can
expect to make once some conventional stores have left the market
and a new equilibrium has been reached, against the losses it will
incur for the remainder of the "shake-out" period while that market
adjustment is still occurring.
This is essentially the same calculation that the warehouse store
made when deciding whether to enter the market. Presumably, if it
was rational for the warehouse store to enter the market in the first
place, because the profits to be gained were greater than the short-
term losses, it is rational for the warehouse store to stay in the mar-
ket when it reevaluates that decision during the "shake-out" period.
However, there are two reasons why this may not always be the
case.
First, when the warehouse store initially decided to enter the
market, it may have been unsure about the size of its potential
short-term losses. It may not have known whether the conventional
stores would respond to its entry by cutting prices, or it may have
underestimated the extent to which prices would fall or the length
of time that price would stay down before some of the traditional
stores exit the market.54 Therefore, even though the initial decision
to enter the market seemed rational, the warehouse store may real-
54. The entrant's uncertainty about future market performance is also important as a
possible explanation for predatory pricing. This is discussed in more detail in Section IV.
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ize after entry that it made a bad decision. When given the chance
to reevaluate that decision during the "shake-out" period, the ware-
house store may decide to exit the market. This would not neces-
sarily be the case, for if the warehouse store would not save very
much by exiting then it might actually be less costly to stay in the
market, even though its owner might now wish that he had never
entered. The point is simply that it would not be impossible for the
warehouse store to decide to exit.
Second, even if the warehouse store decides to stay in the mar-
ket, the losses it must incur to do so may affect its plans with regard
to future expansion. The decision about whether to expand into an
adjacent market is slightly different from the decision about
whether to stay in the first market, because at the time of the deci-
sion the warehouse store will not yet have sunk any investments in
the adjacent market. In effect, the warehouse store can save the
total costs of one store by not investing in a new market, but it can
only recover some of those costs by exiting from a market in which
it has already invested. Thus, if the warehouse store has learned
from experience that the profits it can make will not be enough to
cover the total costs of each store, it will probably decide not to
build any new stores." Competitive price cuts could thereby deter
plans for future expansion, even if they did not cause the warehouse
store to close down its initial store.
C. Difficulties in Distinguishing Predation from Competition
The competitive response to entry analyzed in Sections A and B
involves price cuts which may force the entrant to operate at a loss,
which may lead to the withdrawal of the entrant, and which may
discourage the entrant's expansion into other markets. Unfortu-
nately, these are the same effects that would be observed after a
successful predatory pricing campaign. This is why it is so difficult
to distinguish predatory pricing from ordinary competition.
More specifically, the problem is that traditional antitrust cues,
which focus on whether the defendant's price cuts were designed to
induce exit or to discourage entry, do not work well in conditions of
excess market capacity, where prices must decrease to induce the
exit of some of the capacity. Were the price cuts a direct response
to the warehouse store's entry? Yes; if the entry had not occurred,
55. If the price reduction in the first market was less than the warehouse store had
expected, the effect would be just the opposite, and future expansion plans would be
encouraged.
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there would have been no excess capacity, and no price cuts would
have been needed. Was the conventional store's price lower in the
zone surrounding the warehouse store than in other zones? Yes;
that was the only area in which excess capacity had been created.
Were the price cuts aimed at taking business away from the en-
trant? Yes; the only way each store could minimize its losses was to
spread its fixed costs over a larger sales base, and the only way to do
this was to try to take sales away from the other stores. Could the
price cuts drive the entrant out of business? Yes; this is at least a
possibility, and even if they do not, they might well discourage it
from expanding into other markets. Will prices go back up if the
entrant is eliminated? Yes; once the excess capacity is gone, prices
will inevitably rise until all firms are covering their total costs
again.5
6
Thus, the fact that price wars have deterred entry or discour-
aged expansion by the warehouse stores simply is not probative as
to whether the prices being charged are predatory. It may well be
true that the price wars have occasionally deterred entry or discour-
aged expansion. For example, the president of one warehouse store
is quoted as saying: "If you think I'm going to put another store
near Kroger if this [price war] continues . .. I'd have to be
crazy."5 7 Another president of a warehouse store reported that:
"Kroger caused us enough blood to be spilled, so we're going to
take another look before we try to bring more stores into At-
lanta."' 58 Professor Allvine may well be correct in concluding, after
conducting an empirical survey of zone pricing, that "by meeting,
or coming very near to the warehouse store prices, the grocery
chains are slowing the spread of warehouse operation and reducing
the threat they present to their higher-cost method of retailing."59
56. Thus, Baumol's proposal to prohibit firms from raising prices in response to a com-
petitor's exit would interfere with the normal competitive response to excess capacity, if that
proposal was applied to competitive markets. Baumol implicitly recognized this, and limited
his proposal accordingly. See Baumol, supra note 27 at 4 n. 11 (permanence rule would be an
"unnecessary encumbrance" if applied to a competitive market).
57. Zone Pricing Prompts "Predator' Charge, CHAIN STORE AGE/SUPERMARKETS, Mar.
1982, at 20 (quoting Bill Long, President of Waremart, Inc.). The article also noted that the
two Waremart stores that had been opened in the Memphis markets, where the price war
took place, had not exited. See also Need Freedom in Pricing to Regain Sales: Safeway,
SUPERMARKET NEws, Oct. 24, 1983, at 11 (quoting Mr. Long as saying, "We will not put
new stores in smaller towns where Safeway has only one or two stores. The threat of their
dropping their prices lower than or to the same level of ours is very real.").
58. Atlanta Constitution, Aug. 10, 1982, at C4 (quoting Peter Gregson, Chairman of
Warehouse Groceries Management, Inc.).
59. Allvine, supra note 8.
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The problem is that these same effects would also be observed if the
conventional stores behave competitively and entry or expansion is
hindered only by normal competitive forces.
D. Effects on Welfare
1. Efficiency in the Presence of Fixed Costs
The prospect of a price war during the initial "shake-out" pe-
riod is likely to reduce the warehouse store's expected profits. This
may deter a warehouse store from entering in the first place, or it
may cause it to exit the market during the "shake-out" period, or to
forego plans for future expansion.6° It may seem paradoxical that
competitive behavior by established firms could discourage entry by
a seemingly more efficient warehouse store. This paradox, however,
is explainable.
The explanation lies in the definition (and, more particularly, in
the timing) of the label, "more efficient." When a warehouse store
is considering entry or expansion into a new market, the established
stores in that market will have already sunk substantial investments
in their stores. If the warehouse store enters, it will have to dupli-
cate many of those investments. Thus, even if the warehouse store's
costs are lower than the total costs of operating a conventional
store, the warehouse store's costs may not be lower than the amount
that could be saved if a conventional store were to exit. In that
case, it would be inefficient to replace a conventional store with a
warehouse store, so the effect of competitive pricing in deterring
entry by the warehouse store is exactly the result the market ought
to produce.
In the long run, if the warehouse store really has lower total
costs then its entry will not be permanently blocked. Although a
new warehouse store will be more costly than an established store in
the short-run, while the conventional stores have already sunk their
investment in existing facilities, this relationship will change over
time as each investment comes up for renewal. The established
stores will not renew those investments unless they can expect to
recover the total costs of each investment, and they will not be able
to do this if a more efficient warehouse store is about to enter the
market. Indeed, if warehouse stores are actually more efficient than
conventional stores, the conventional store owners may decide not
to reinvest in their conventional store but to replace it with a ware-
60. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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house store.6' In general, the greater the technical efficiency of the
warehouse store relative to the conventional store, the longer the
warehouse store will be able to bear short-term losses while waiting
for the conventional stores to disinvest, and the sooner a warehouse
store will find it profitable to enter.
2. Efficiency if the Pre-entry Market is Not Perfectly Competitive
An important qualification must be appended to the analysis de-
veloped in the preceding sections. There are some situations where
the market does not provide the proper incentives for entry, and in
these cases the preceding analysis is not necessarily appropriate.
For example, monopolistic competition between sellers with differ-
entiated products does not inevitably lead to the optimal amount of
variety among the market's offerings.6 2 If this type of competition
results in too little diversity in retailing formats, welfare gains could
conceivably result from encouraging the entry of warehouse stores
by preventing conventional stores from cutting prices as far as they
normally would.63 However, to preserve those welfare gains prices
might have to be permanently maintained above competitive levels
to prevent market forces from subsequently driving the warehouse
store back out of the market. In addition, the same models of mo-
nopolistic competition show that it is equally possible for there to be
too much diversity in retailing formats," in which case a better pol-
icy would be to relax the pricing rules so as to make it easier for
price cuts to discourage entry. The indeterminacy of these optimal
61. Many supermarket chains have already opened their own warehouse outlets where
the warehouse outlet attracted customers away from the chain's conventional stores. See
supra note 33. One supermarket owner described the problem as follows: "Suicide's better
than murder. If I don't build it, somebody else will." Cub Power Shakes Up Potential Com-
petitors, SUPERMARKET NEws, Feb. 28, 1983, at 1.
62. See Dixit & Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity, 67
AM. ECON. REV. 295 (1977); K. LANCASTER, VARIETY, EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY (1979).
For an application of this analysis to another antitrust issue, see Comanor, Vertical Price
Fixing and Market Restrictions and the New Antitrust Policy, 98 HARV. L. REV. 983 (1985).
63. A similar argument would apply if there were noneconomic goals that would be
served by protecting warehouse stores for their own sake. Cf United States v. Von's Grocery
Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966) (endorsing the use of the antitrust laws to "halt the gradual demise
of the small businessman"). More recent Supreme Court decisions appear to have abandoned
this goal, at least where the preservation for small businessmen cannot also be justified on
economic grounds. Cf Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21
(1977) ("an antitrust policy divorced from market considerations would lack any objective
benchmarks"). Such arguments are beyond the scope of this Article. We only note here that
attempting to serve these noneconomic goals by adjusting the predation standard would raise
administrative problems similar to those discussed in the text.
64. See supra note 62.
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diversity arguments, combined with the obvious administrative
costs of a rule preventing conventional stores from lowering prices
in response to the entry of a warehouse store, argue against using
predatory pricing rules to achieve the optimal level of diversity.65
Similar problems arise if the conventional stores do not act as
perfect competitors, with each taking the others' prices as given, but
instead collude (either explicitly or by tacitly recognizing their in-
terdependence) to raise prices above the competitive level. Entry by
a warehouse store, even a warehouse store whose entry would not
have been efficient if the conventional stores had been pricing com-
petitively, might then increase social welfare by disrupting the pat-
tern of collusion. In this situation, there could be welfare gains
from limiting the extent to which conventional stores could reduce
their prices, in order to make it easier for warehouse stores to enter.
As Professor Scherer has pointed out, the extent of the welfare gains
would depend on a trade-off between the short-run inefficiency
caused by preventing conventional stores from pricing competi-
tively during the "shake-out" period and the long-run efficiency
gains caused by encouraging entry to break up the pattern of collu-
sive pricing. 6
Unfortunately, deciding where the permissible price level should
be under this theory is a difficult, if not impossible task. In general,
it depends on the the extent to which the established stores had
been charging prices above the perfectly competitive price prior to
entry and on the extent to which a warehouse store's entry would
help bring those prices down. Thus, the pricing standard should be
raised the most in a market where there are extremely high monop-
oly profits being earned prior to the entry of a warehouse store, and
the least in markets that are competitive (all else equal). The struc-
tural characteristics of the grocery industry in this regard are ana-
lyzed in Section IV.
65. Moreover, a contrary rule would only improve welfare at the price of increasing the
established stores' short-term losses. In effect, the established store would be called on to
bear the costs of the subsidies necessary to provide the socially desirable incentives for in-
creased diversity. It is not at all clear that this is the role the antitrust laws were intended to
play. See Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The
Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982) (suggesting that Congress
was less concerned about optimal economic efficiency, and more concerned about preventing
unjustified transfers of wealth when it passed the Sherman Act).
66. Scherer, supra note 28, at 883-89. But see 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST
LAW 166-67 (1976) (arguing that long-run tradeoffs are too difficult for courts to consider).
As discussed in Section IV, the assumption that there is supercompetitive pricing prior to
entry may not be very sound in retail grocery markets.
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E. A Note on Excess Capacity
One final point must be addressed with regard to the assumption
that the entry of a warehouse store creates a condition of excess
capacity." The entry of a warehouse store would not create excess
capacity if the market previously had too few stores, for example, if
a sudden population growth had exceeded the capacity of existing
stores.68 In that case, if the market is large enough to support all of
the conventional stores plus the new warehouse store at each store's
minimum efficient scale, the conventional stores will not be losing
money so there is no need for them to reduce their prices upon the
entry of a warehouse store.
One reason for our assumption of excess capacity has to do with
the "lumpiness" of entry into the retail grocery market. For exam-
ple, suppose that a neighborhood is served by four different super-
markets. The entry of a new, similarly-sized store would increase
total market capacity by twenty-five percent. If the market had
been operating at a competitive capacity prior to entry, it is very
likely that entry on such a scale will create a condition of excess
capacity. The volume of business that previously supported four
stores simply may not be enough to support five.
Obviously, this conclusion depends on a number of assumptions
about the efficient scale of entry and the shape of the stores' cost
curves. Whether excess capacity exists in a particular market is a
factual question that can only be answered on the basis of a full
investigation. Two pieces of evidence, however, do suggest that ex-
cess capacity after entry may not be uncommon. First, for various
reasons, such as changes in food-buying habits and the growth of
fast food restaurants, the grocery industry as a whole may be "over-
stored." A recent trade article reported that "despite the tide of
store closings, which weeded out many small and unprofitable su-
permarkets around the country, there are still approximately 20%
more supermarkets than are actually needed."69 It is not clear what
this figure was based on, and national conditions would not neces-
sarily reflect the capacity in every local market anyway. Neverthe-
less, this commentary does suggest that excess capacity is not an
impossibility.
67. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
68. Excess capacity could also be less likely if retail grocery markets were perfectly com-
petitive rather than monopolistically competitive and conventional stores' cost curves were
perfectly horizontal over a large portion of their range.
69. How Hard Will Warehouse Pricing Hit? CHAIN STORE AGE/SUPERMARKETS, Jan.
1980, at 36.
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Second, the entry of warehouse stores has not been met with
price wars in every instance. Most of the reported cases without
price wars seem to involve sun belt locations where recent popula-
tion growth may have left local markets with insufficient rather
than excess capacity. According to a Supermarket News survey ar-
ticle, conventional stores in Houston, Albuquerque, and northern
Texas did not drop prices in response to the entry of warehouse
stores.7° Conditions in a region as a whole are not necessarily indic-
ative of the capacity in a particular local market that a warehouse
store has entered, but these facts are consistent with the possibility
that in those cases entry did not produce excess capacity.
Most generally, our point is that excess capacity may be more
common in predatory pricing cases than is usually recognized in the
literature. The literature has typically assumed that the alleged
predator is a monopolist, in which case excess capacity is unlikely,
since monopolists tend to produce too little output. At most, there
has been a grudging recognition that excess capacity may be present
in unusual cases, such as those involving declining industries.7"
However, many predatory pricing cases involve markets where it is
not clear whether the defendant has monopoly power and where the
hypothesis that the market is behaving competitively cannot be im-
mediately rejected. In these markets-and especially in markets
best described by models of monopolistic competition, where firms
in equilibrium are necessarily operating at the maximum capacity
the market will support---excess capacity is a distinct possibility.
Thus, any legal rule concerning predatory pricing must deal
with the possibility that the market may have been at a competitive
equilibrium prior to entry and that the entry disrupted that equilib-
rium by creating temporary excess capacity. In such a market, tem-
porary price cuts are the normal market mechanism for
determining whether the entrant will succeed or fail in displacing an
established firm. A legal rule that makes such price cuts more diffi-
cult only frustrates that mechanism without producing any corre-
sponding social benefits.
70. Markets React with Vigor to Box Store Competition, SUPERMARKET NEWS, Apr. 28,
1980, at 4. Price wars occurred in San Antonio, but these were apparently in response to the
entry of Kroger on a very large scale rather than in response to the entry of a warehouse
store. See Groceries Aiming Low in City Price Wars, ADVERTISING AGE, Nov. 23, 1981, at
44; Handy Andy Sues H.E.B. in "Predatory Pricing" Case, SUPERMARKET NEWS, June 21,
1982, at 1.
71. Professors Joskow and Klevorick explicitly take this position. Joskow & Klevorick,
supra note 3, at 253-54. See also supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
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III. DEFINING THE Loss-MINIMIZING PRICE
A predatory pricing standard can address the problem of distin-
guishing between predatory and competitive pricing in one of two
ways. One method is to exclude from consideration any market
that was behaving competitively prior to the alleged predation.
This approach was taken explicitly in the Joskow-Klevorick propo-
sal, which would dismiss any case in which the market structure
was not conducive to long-term monopoly power.72 Such a limit is
also implicit in the proposals of Professors Baumol, Williamson,
and Scherer.73
Another approach is to still require that the defendant keep its
prices above some measure of variable costs, even if the market ap-
pears to be competitive. This is the position taken by some com-
mentators, who argue that as a practical matter it is too difficult for
courts to tell whether any given market presents a serious risk of
long-term monopoly power.74 As noted earlier, this approach has
been adopted by many federal courts.75
This second approach is consistent with the analysis of Section
II, which showed that competitive firms have no legitimate reason
to respond to entry by pricing below marginal or average variable
costs. However, Section II did not attempt to define these concepts
as they would apply to multiproduct retailers such as grocery
stores. This section will demonstrate that the application of such a
standard to multiproduct retailers presents many serious problems.
72. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
73. Professor Baumol's position is described earlier at note 56. Professor Williamson
also acknowledges that "[his] output rule is restricted to dominant firms and collusive oligop-
olies." Williamson, supra note 26, 88 YALE L.J. at 1194. Professor Scherer does not explic-
itly state an exception for competitively structured industries, but he suggests that courts
should inquire into, among other things, "the structural consequences actually flowing from
the [challenged] behavior." Scherer, supra note 28, at 890. Presumably, Scherer would not
find a violation if the industry structure was such that there was no risk of long-term monop-
oly power.
74. This is apparently the position of the original article by Professors Areeda and Tur-
ner which made no exception for competitively-structured industries. Areeda & Turner,
supra note I, at 704-20. See also Zerbe & Cooper, supra note 4, at 691-92 (criticizing the
Joskow-Klevorick "two tier" approach and advocating a price-cost standard to be applied to
all industries); McGee, supra note 22, at 319-20, 326 (supporting similar approach if there is
to be any rule against price cutting at all). While Professor Areeda has also emphasized the
difficulty of determining which industries are susceptible to long-run monopoly power, he
now is apparently willing to make an exception to his variable cost standard for markets
where monopoly power is clearly unlikely. P. AREEDA, supra note 18, 123-24.
75. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. But see supra note 25.
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A. Fixed, Variable and Recoverable Costs
The reason why a competitive firm should not price below its
variable costs is derived from the more basic principle that any firm
trying to maximize its profits or minimize its losses should not take
any action unless the gains from that action equal or exceed its
costs. When the action at issue is the continued sale of a product,
and the firm is a competitor who takes the market price as given,
the gains from selling the product are the market price of that prod-
uct multiplied by the number of units sold.76 Thus, a competitive
firm should continue selling a product as long as the market price is
at or above the marginal cost of each additional sale.
However, "marginal" in this context can have several meanings.
Properly interpreted, the appropriate "marginal" cost depends on
the alternative to which the chosen course of action is being com-
pared. For example, one choice facing a firm is whether to continue
selling at the same level of output or whether to reduce its output
and sell one unit less. For purposes of this decision, the appropriate
marginal costs are the costs that would be saved by reducing total
output by one unit, so it is these costs that should be compared to
the gains from each sale (that is, the market price). This is the in-
terpretation most economists give to the term marginal costs.
Reducing output by a single unit is not the only alternative a
firm must consider, though. It could also reduce production to, say,
half of its previous output and make only half as many sales. In this
case, the benefits that would be foregone are still equal to the mar-
ket price multiplied by the number of sales. However, the costs that
would be saved may be substantially different from the costs that
would have been saved by reducing output by only one unit. If out-
put is cut in half, the firm may be able to sell some of its production
equipment, lay off some of its employees, move to a lower rent loca-
tion, or make any number of other changes that would not have
been possible if output had been reduced by only a single unit. The
appropriate comparison in this case is therefore the total sales reve-
nues the firm would be giving up (the market price multiplied by
half the total output), versus the amount of the firm's total costs
that it would be able to save. In other words, the firm should cut its
output in half if the average or per-unit revenue (the market price)
76. If the firm is a monopolistic competitor, it need not take the market price as given,
and this principle needs a slight qualification. See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
An adjustment is also required when sales of one product increase the revenue received from
other products. See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
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falls below the average change in total costs (the reduction in total
costs divided by the number of units of output no longer being pro-
duced). This average change in total costs is closer to what econo-
mists call average variable costs.
The extreme example of this calculus is the case of a firm that
would save more by shutting down entirely than it would lose by
giving up all of its sales at the current market price. A firm which
shuts down entirely will reduce its costs by an amount equal to all
of its current operating expenses plus whatever it can salvage from
its fixed assets. For example, a supermarket which goes out of busi-
ness will no longer have any costs for labor or utilities. If it can sell
its inventory, equipment, and the store building or any portion of
the lease that remains, it will have eliminated these costs as well,
except to the extent that the price received for the assets falls short
of their original cost to the store. The part of the total costs which
can be recovered in this way is referred to as either the non-sunk,
recoverable, or total incremental costs.7 Thus, if total sales reve-
nue falls below the firm's recoverable costs-or to put it another
way, if the firm's average revenue falls below its average recoverable
costs-the firm will minimize its losses by shutting its doors alto-
gether. If the firm is acting as a profit-maximizing competitor, it
should not be willing to stay in the market under these conditions.
Seen from this perspective, disagreements between proponents
of variable and marginal cost standards are really only disagree-
ments over how much of a reduction in sales the firm should be
required to consider. Marginal, variable, and recoverable costs are
all concepts involving the extent to which total costs would be re-
duced if total output were changed.7" They differ only in the degree
of change in total output which is being considered, and even then
the difference is one of degree and not of kind. In theory, a profit-
maximizing firm will consider all possible changes in output which
might minimize its losses.79 Therefore, the remainder of this sec-
77. Baumol, supra note 27, at 9 n.26; Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 3, at 252 n.79.
See also MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1115-18
(7th Cir. 1983).
78. To make a technical distinction, "variable" costs are usually those which can be
reduced by cutting output to zero without going out of business, while "recoverable" costs
include any costs which can be saved by going out of business. For example, a store's lease
would not normally be a variable cost (if the rent must be paid even if the store does not sell
anything), but it probably would be a recoverable cost if the store could find a subtenant for
the site if it closed operations entirely. But either variable or recoverable costs can also be
thought of as "marginal" costs in the sense that they are marginal to some specified change in
the firm's behavior.
79. For a more technical analysis supporting this conclusion see Ordover & Willig,
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tion will not be concerned with preserving careful distinctions
among these terms. Recoverable costs will be the term used here,
relying on a precise specification of the change in output being con-
sidered when there is danger of confusion.
B. The Proper Unit of Analysis
The previous section described a firm selling a single product,
which had only to decide how much of that product to produce and
sell. This is obviously not the situation of a retail grocery store,
which must make pricing decisions on thousands of products or
product lines. The general principle, however, is still the same. A
competitive firm should not continue to make sales in any product,
product line, department, or even an entire store, when the revenues
received from those sales at current prices do not cover the costs
that could be saved if those sales were discontinued.
In theory, therefore, a single product is a perfectly appropriate
unit of analysis. In most cases, if a store were to cut back on sales
of one particular product (say, Crest toothpaste) the only savings in
costs would be the wholesale price of that product.80 It is unlikely
that discontinuing sales of Crest alone would allow the store to re-
duce its labor costs, its energy bills, or its store rental, so none of
those elements of overhead costs should be treated as recoverable
costs in this context. There might, however, be a savings from be-
ing able to use the shelf space that formerly held the discontinued
product to sell some other product. In such a case, the opportunity
cost of that shelf space (admittedly a difficult figure to calculate)
should also be counted as a recoverable cost. If the average of these
recoverable costs exceeds the price that the store is charging for the
discontinued product, the store is not minimizing losses or maxi-
mizing profits the way that a competitive store would."'
A similar analysis is also appropriate with regard to an entire
department or group of products (for example, all bathroom sup-
plies). The costs saved by eliminating those sales would include not
supra note 20, at 16-18. See also William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental
Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1037 (9th Cir. 1981) (adopting a similar approach to defining
"variable costs").
80. Note that if a product line is being completely discontinued and the firm cannot
easily resell the inventory it had on hand, even the invoice price of that inventory is not a
recoverable cost. In such a case, the only recoverable cost is the price at which the inventory
can be resold. In the very short run, a competitive store would therefore be willing to cut its
price all the way down to this level.
81. A necessary qualification to this statement dealing with the case of "loss leader"
pricing is discussed in part D of this Section.
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only the wholesale prices of the individual items and the imputed
value of the shelf-space used to display them, but could also include
some items that might normally be classified as overhead costs. For
example, the advertising devoted to bathroom items could be elimi-
nated and the amount saved by running smaller advertisements or
being able to use more space to advertise other products would be
counted as a recoverable cost. If bathroom sales had been a large
enough portion of the store's total sales, the store might be able to
reduce the number of checkout clerks or stock-handlers, in which
case the reduction in labor costs should also be treated as recover-
able costs. In general, the costs that qualify as "recoverable" for a
whole set of products will be larger than the sum of the recoverable
costs for each individual product because more overhead costs can
be recovered if large groups of products are simultaneously discon-
tinued. The principle is still the same, though. If the recoverable
costs exceed the revenues derived from those products at current
prices, then a competitive store would minimize its losses by discon-
tinuing those sales.
The application of this analysis to an entire store should now be
clear. Discontinuing the operation of an entire store will save all
operating expenses such as labor costs or utility bills. It will also
save all of the fixed costs associated with that store except for those
which are sunk, such as insurance premiums which will not be re-
funded by the insurance company, or rental payments on a lease for
which no sublessee can be found. If the store is part of a chain, it
may also be possible to recover some of the costs associated with the
chain as a whole. For example, with one less store in the city the
chain may be able to pay its area manager less, reduce its warehouse
expenses for that area, or do less advertising in that area. These
savings should all be treated as recoverable costs, and if the current
market prices do not result in enough revenue to cover the total
amount of these recoverable costs, a competitive firm should close
the store.
C. Welfare and Recoverable Costs
The point of the preceding section is that a store is not competi-
tively pricing if its prices do not cover its recoverable costs at every
level of analysis. However, the converse is also true. If a store sets
prices so as to cover the total recoverable costs for every product
and every group of products taken together, it is pricing in a com-
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petitive manner and should not be the object of antitrust concern. 2
The implications of this conclusion are not always obvious. For
instance, it is often alleged that conventional supermarkets respond
to the entry of a warehouse store by lowering the prices of the items
sold by the warehouse store, which consist primarily of staples, and
making up the lost revenue by raising the prices of fresh produce
and other items which the warehouse store does not provide.83 The
analysis of the preceding sections, however, suggests that there may
be nothing wrong with this practice, as long as the conventional
store is at least pricing above its recoverable costs for each depart-
ment and individual item. That is, there may be nothing wrong
with the conventional store paying for its entire overhead from the
revenue received from items on which it does not compete with the
warehouse store, and pricing the items on which it does compete at
a level which barely covers the recoverable cost for those items.84
At first glance, this practice seems unfair to the warehouse store.
Faced with this sort of pricing, the warehouse store will not be prof-
itable unless it can cover its total costs with prices that are high
enough only to pay for a conventional store's marginal or recover-
able costs. However, this is actually an efficient result, because if
the warehouse store's total costs are not lower than the conven-
tional store's marginal costs on the items which are carried by both,
82. Keep in mind the possible adjustments to this standard noted earlier in part D of
Section II, if the incumbent stores had not been pricing as perfect competitors prior to the
warehouse store's entry.
83. There is some empirical evidence to support this. A study of supermarket chains'
responses to competition from limited-line discount stores before the advent of warehouse
stores, found that supermarkets charged a much lower price for standard groceries. How-
ever, they charged a slightly higher price for meat, a product not sold by the discount store.
The overall effect, though, was that the supermarket's average prices in cities where it faced
discount stores' competition were slightly lower than in cities without such competition.
Mori & Gorman, An Empirical Investigation into the Relationship Between Market Structure
and Performance as Measured by Prices, 48 J. FARM ECON. 162, 169-70 (1966).
84. Although it seems like the conventional store is engaging in cross-subsidization,
which usually implies some form of market power, it is actually just the opposite. When
there are joint costs to selling several products, at least some products will have to be priced
high enough to cover those joint costs as well as the marginal costs associated with each
product alone. Market power is present only if the firm's revenues on its products as a whole
are sufficient to give it supracompetitive returns, or if the firm is able to price any single
product above the price that a firm selling that product alone could charge. Thus, when a
warehouse store forces a conventional store to lower its prices on staple items down to the
costs of a store which carries staple items alone, it could just as easily be described as ending
a form of cross-subsidization. For similar judicial treatment of the cross-subsidization issue,
see MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1123-25 (7th
Cir. 1983); Northeastern Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 88-90 (2d Cir.
1981).
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then it is socially more efficient to have those items retailed only in
conventional stores. If the conventional stores are the only ones
who will carry uncommon or difficult items such as fresh produce,
8 5
the amount of overhead expenses that are necessary to carry these
items alone are irrelevant to the question of which stores ought to
carry the remaining staple items. The only extra costs to society
from having the conventional stores carry staple items are the re-
coverable costs that could be saved if conventional stores were to
stop carrying those items. If these recoverable costs are lower than
a warehouse store's total costs, then it is cheaper to society to have
the conventional stores carry the staple items.
D. Applying a Recoverable Cost Standard
A recoverable cost standard is theoretically justified even in ap-
parently competitive industries because no loss-minimizing compet-
itive firm should ever set its price below recoverable costs. 86 In
practice, however, when multiproduct retail operations are at issue
it is impossible to apply the exact standard for which this theoreti-
cal ideal would require. Instead, innumerable practical adjustments
have to be made, and such an adjusted standard can easily prevent
defendants from reducing prices to the truly competitive price.
This section will describe some of those difficulties.
1. Adjustments for Revenue Spillovers
One adjustment reflects the fact that the price a conventional
supermarket charges for one product or set of products will often
affect the revenue the store earns on other products. For example,
it is common for stores to charge low prices for some items, usually
advertised specials, in order to attract customers into the store
where they will presumably purchase other items as well.8 7 If these
"loss leader" products are sold below the store's wholesale costs,
the preceding analysis might suggest that a competitive firm would
benefit from not making those sales, and that the "loss leader"
prices might therefore be predatory.
The preceding analysis, however, cannot be applied in this way.
85. The reasoning is similar to the analysis developed in Section II, comparing ware-
house and conventional stores when conventional stores had already made certain invest-
ments and the warehouse store had not. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
87. See, eg., Lormar, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,498 (S.D. Ohio
1979); Nelson, Price Competition Among Retail Food Stores - Theory, Practice, and Policy
Cues, 48 J. FARM ECON. 172, 183-84 (1966).
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The preceding analysis began with the assumption that the revenues
generated by a product or product line consist solely of the price for
which the product is sold, but this is obviously not the case when
the sale of one product also increases the sales of other products."8
In such a situation, a competitive store would be willing to cut the
price of any given product until the revenue generated from the sale
of that product plus that product's contribution to increased reve-
nue from the sale of other products equals the recoverable costs
associated with the first product. In other words, a price would not
be below the competitive level unless it fell below that product's
recoverable costs minus the contribution that product made toward
increasing other sales. This adjustment reduces the price that a
competitive firm could legitimately charge. It thus explains why
stores are willing to price some items below cost even when not
engaged in an attempt at predation.
A similar adjustment may be required when comparing prices to
costs over a larger group of products. Part of the attraction of con-
ventional supermarkets is that they carry a full range of products.
If a conventional store were to discontinue an entire set of products,
such as all products carried by the warehouse store, it would lose
both the revenue from the sale of those products and the revenue
gained on all other sales to customers who would no longer be will-
ing to shop at a less-than-full-line supermarket. A competitive store
would therefore continue to sell the staple products as long as their
prices did not fall below the recoverable costs associated with those
products minus the contribution to revenue those products made by
bringing customers into the store.
As with the adjustment for pre-entry monopoly prices, 9 it is
difficult to calculate just how much of a price reduction this would
imply in any particular case. It is difficult to determine how many
customers are brought into the store by a low price on any particu-
lar item, or how much those customers are likely to spend on other
items in the store, so it will always be easy for a store to claim that a
given price cut was justified by this sort of revenue spillover. Thus,
88. For a more technical analysis of demand interdependencies, including the case
where the discontinued product is a substitute good whose availability reduces sales of other
goods sold by the same firm, see Ordover & Willig, supra note 20, at 20-21. This issue is
analogous to interdependencies on the cost side when sales of one product reduce the costs of
producing another product (for example, when production costs are subject to significant
"experience curve" effects). Designing an appropriate cost-based predation standard to fit
these cases has long been recognized as raising special problems. See, e.g., Areeda & Turner,
supra note 1, at 697.
89. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
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this adjustment clearly must be treated with great care, and one
could argue that such spillovers should be clearly documented
before being considered in antitrust litigation. However, if a strict
evidentiary standard would prevent consideration of valid spillover
effects that simply cannot be proven, legitimate competitive price-
cutting could thereby be discouraged.
On a practical level, one way to minimize this difficulty is to
conduct cost-revenue comparisons only for an entire store and not
for any smaller units of analysis. While the operation of one store
may have some effects on the revenue generated by other stores in
the chain (for example, by maintaining the chain's visibility
throughout a metropolitan area) those effects are probably much
smaller than the revenue spillovers between individual product lines
within a single store.9" Ignoring any smaller units of analysis ad-
mittedly makes it possible for a store to engage in predatory pricing
by charging below the loss-minimizing price on only those items
carried by the warehouse store. However, without such an adjust-
ment there is no practicable way that a price-cost standard can deal
with the revenue spillover problem.91
2. Adjustments for Price Effects
In other situations, the current price of a product may overstate
the amount of revenue the firm would lose by reducing sales rather
than understate the effect on revenue. This could easily be the case
if the market is monopolistically competitive and the firm is consid-
ering only a partial reduction in sales rather than entirely eliminat-
ing a product. In a monopolistically competitive market, a firm
that is willing to reduce its sales can do so by charging a higher
price on the fewer units that it continues to sell.92 A firm consider-
ing such a reduction should therefore balance the costs it would
save against the revenue it would lose from making fewer sales mi-
nus the revenue that would be gained from charging a higher price
90. There may also be countereffects. A chain that closes one store would probably pick
up some of those customers and thus increase sales and revenue at one of its nearby stores.
91. Cf 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTrrRusT LAW 183 (1976) (arguing that when
joint production costs are substantial, cost-revenue comparisons should be drawn for the en-
tire mix of products and not for individual product lines). Professors Areeda and Turner are
more skeptical about allowing monopolists to make adjustments for revenue as opposed to
cost spillovers, but they specifically note that their skepticism would not apply to "such
promotional devices as 'loss leader' selling by grocery or department stores." Id. at 184 n.2;
see also Lormar, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 1979-I Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,498 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
92. This is because monopolistically competitive firms face a downward-sloping demand
curve (see Figure 1). A firm in a perfectly competitive market would not have this option
because it would lose all its sales if it tried to raise its price even slightly.
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on the sales it made. Thus, even when a product's price is slightly
above the seller's recoverable costs, a monopolistically competitive
firm may still minimize its losses by reducing its sales and charging
a higher price. In this situation, the price standard should be at
some level above average recoverable costs.
The size of this adjustment is extremely difficult to calculate.
Moreover, the adjustment would not be necessary at all in markets
that are perfectly competitive. Also, in markets that approach per-
fect competition (where sellers are weakly differentiated and as a
result demand curves are almost fiat), the necessary adjustment is
extremely small. Furthermore, since this adjustment works in the
opposite direction from the adjustment for revenue spillovers, errors
caused by ignoring one adjustment may be compensated for by ig-
noring the other. Thus, while it is important to recognize these two
problems, as a practical matter these two adjustments are probably
not worth incorporating into a recoverable cost standard that is to
be administered by judges and juries.93
3. Adjustments for the Time Frame of Analysis
Another problem is that the classification of any cost as being
either recoverable or nonrecoverable depends on the time span that
is being considered. For example, if the challenged price reduction
lasted only a few days, it is clear that the store would have recov-
ered very few costs if it had chosen to do less business over those
few days instead of reducing prices. It is impractical for a store to
lay off any of its employees, to sell any of its equipment, or to trans-
fer any of its inventory for such a short time. Therefore, almost
none of these costs would be recoverable. At the other extreme, if
the challenged price reduction was maintained for several years, the
store would have had an opportunity to reconsider almost all of its
fixed investments, so virtually all of its costs would be recoverable.
In theory, the time frame that should control the classification
of costs as recoverable or nonrecoverable is the time that the price
cuts were in effect. 94 This period is the unit of time for which the
93. A similar analysis is suggested by Professors Ordover and Willig. Ordover & Willig,
supra note 20, at 16 nn. 24-25. See also 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 160-
62 (1976) (discussing the related difficulties involved in attempting to prohibit a monopolist
from "limit pricing" by setting a price above costs but below the profit-maximizing monopoly
price).
94. This was the definition adopted by the Federal Trade Commission in the order set-
tling its predatory pricing charges against Borden. In re Borden, Inc., 48 Fed. Reg. 9023
(Mar. 3, 1983). For a description of the Borden litigation, see generally Schmalansee, supra
note 2; Borden, Inc. v. FTC, 674 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1982).
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firm chose to increase its output compared to what it would have
sold at a higher price, or compared to shutting down. However,
there are some practical difficulties with this time frame. First, the
firm may not have known how long the price war would last, and
may in fact have been planning for a much longer or shorter period
of price reduction. These expectations would affect the number of
costs that could appropriately be classified as recoverable. 95 More-
over, during the period of the price war the firm may have had to
reinvest in fixed assets with an expected life that exceeded the ex-
pected duration of the price war, and whose profitability would
therefore depend on the firm's expectations about post-war prices as
well. The actual duration of the price war and the actual level of
the post-war prices are less important than the firm's reasonable
expectations regarding those two factors.
This is particularly important when considering whether a com-
petitive firm would have minimized losses by shutting down en-
tirely. If the price war is expected to be temporary and there are
costs involved in closing down and restarting later, a rational, com-
petitive store would be willing to set prices below its average recov-
erable costs if it expects to reopen after the price war.96 There are
at least some costs incurred in reopening grocery stores, such as the
cost of rehiring employees or rebuilding the loyalty of angry cus-
tomers. Factoring such costs into the analysis not only depends on
having an accurate measure of those costs, but also depends on the
firm's estimate of the length of the price war.
Thus, a precise classification of costs as recoverable or
nonrecoverable must take into account the actual or expected
length of the price war, which is probably impossible to do. Profes-
sors Areeda and Turner recognized this and adopted what they re-
fer to as "a relatively arbitrary definition of middle-run variability
in which most costs, including general overhead, are considered va-
riable." 97 If a line must be drawn somewhere, then in many cases
this may be an appropriate place to draw it, as a "middle-run" time
span is presumably equally likely to be too long as too short, or too
95. The expectation of a long price war will increase the number of costs that would
appropriately be classified as recoverable, while the expectation of a short price war will
reduce the number of those costs.
96. P. AREEDA, supra note 18, at 151-53; Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 3, at 251
n.77. See also William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d
1014, 1035 n.32 (9th Cir. 1981).
97. P. AREEDA, supra note 18, at 147. Even this classification is described by Professor
Areeda as presumptive rather than absolute. He recognizes that the ideal time span would be
one based on the actual duration of the price cuts.
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lenient as too strict. However, this judgment must also rest on
some assessment of the relative likelihood of each sort of error-
that is, on the relative likelihood of competitive or predatory price
cuts, an issue which is addressed in Section IV.98 The key point is
that whatever standard is chosen will necessarily leave a large de-
gree of uncertainty about whether it accurately distinguishes be-
tween predatory and nonpredatory, competitive price-cutting
behavior.
4. Other Practical Difficulties
The adjustments discussed in the preceding sections are really
only special examples of the great practical difficulties inherent in
the application of a cost-based standard to multiproduct retail oper-
ations. Considerable difficulties remain even if such adjustments are
ignored and we focus solely on measuring middle-run recoverable
costs. Some of the difficulties involve accounting problems-for ex-
ample, a supermarket's records may not indicate what portion of
the store's advertising was devoted to goods sold by both the super-
market and the warehouse store, or the records may not be suffi-
cient to permit an estimate of the opportunity cost of the shelf space
used to display a particular product.
Other difficulties are not merely accounting problems; they re-
quire the court to measure something that never took place. Any
test based on recoverable costs requires the court to consider what
would have happened had the store cut back on sales of certain
products. In other words, a court must estimate what a store would
have done if it had done something other than what it did. For
example, the court may have to decide how many checkout clerks
or stock handlers the store would have laid off if it had stopped
selling a certain line of products, or how much less advertising a
chain would have needed to do if it had closed the store in the
neighborhood where the warehouse store entered. It will always be
possible to get more-or-less "expert" opinions on these questions,
but any decision based on such "expert" opinions must be an ex-
tremely uncertain one.
The usual response to these practical difficulties is to design sim-
ple rules of thumb which try to roughly approximate the true recov-
erable costs, knowing that they will overstate those costs in some
cases and understate them in others. Rules based on fully allocated
costs are one example. Applied to multiproduct firms or multistore
98. See infra notes 99-130 and accompanying text.
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chains, such rules generally assign overhead costs to each product
line or each store in proportion to the sales generated by that store
or product line, or in proportion to some other rough but easily-
calculated factor. In effect, such rules proceed as if the recoverable
costs associated with each store or product line could be estimated
by these formulas. In practice, though, such allocations can easily
overestimate the truly recoverable costs, for they allocate some
costs that will have been irrevocably sunk and others which, though
recoverable if the entire chain were closed down, may not be recov-
erable at all in connection with any individual store or product line.
The adjustments discussed in this section might be defensible in
industries where predatory pricing is a serious danger. The primary
alternative to such adjustments is an extremely lenient standard,
and if predatory pricing is a great danger then the risk of failing to
prohibit true instances of predation may outweigh the risk of
prohibiting innocent, competitive price cuts. If predation is not a
serious threat, though, a crude price-cost standard is likely to have
only negative effects by deterring some competitive price cuts with-
out serving as a check on predation. Section IV therefore examines
the likelihood of predatory pricing by conventional supermarkets.
IV. PREDATORY RESPONSES To ENTRY
If grocery markets are not perfectly competitive, conventional
supermarkets may have incentives to cut prices below the competi-
tive loss-minimizing level described in sections II and III, 99 in order
to prevent the entry of warehouse stores whose entry is economi-
cally desirable. Thus, while Sections II and III assumed supermar-
kets act as perfect competitors, in this section we assume
supermarkets are deliberate predators.
For convenience, we also assume in this section that the ware-
house store would just barely find the market profitable if the con-
ventional stores respond in a competitive manner. In other words,
the warehouse store would suffer losses during the initial "shake-
out" period, but the profits the warehouse store could expect to
make once the market returned to equilibrium would be just enough
to compensate for those losses and make entry profitable. This as-
sumption allows us to analyze the effect of predation on a truly
marginal entrant, whose entry could be rendered unprofitable
99. For the remainder of Section IV, the price path defined in Sections II and III will be
referred to as the "competitive" price, while any price below that level will be called
"predatory."
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merely by the slightest increase in expected costs. This is the most
plausible case for predation. In markets where warehouse stores
face better prospects, much greater losses would be required to
make entry unprofitable.
Part A of this section sets out the traditional theory of "deep
pocket" predation. Part B discusses predatory strategies used
against entrants with imperfect information. Ultimately, neither of
these predatory strategies is likely to be very successful in the retail
grocery industry.
A. Traditional "Deep Pocket" Predation
The traditional theory of predatory pricing posits a predator
who reduces prices below the competitive level, holding them there
until the victim is driven out of business because he can no longer
afford to sell at a loss."o The predator, free from the victim's com-
petition, can then raise prices and earn enough profits to compen-
sate for the losses incurred and profits foregone during the price
war. For this strategy to be successful, it must succeed in eliminat-
ing the entrant and lead to a period of higher profits that will more
than make up for the earlier losses. Each of these conditions must
be examined.
1. Will the Victim be Eliminated?
Even if a supermarket is willing to reduce prices below the com-
petitive level to drive out an entering warehouse store, it is not clear
that this strategy will succeed. We have assumed that even a slight
price reduction below the competitive level is enough to make entry
unprofitable for a warehouse store that is still deciding whether to
enter. But once the warehouse store has sunk the investments nec-
essary to enter the market, it will stay in the market even if it is not
earning any profits, unless prices fall so low that it is not earning
enough to cover the costs it would save if it exited. This would
happen only in the case of a very large price reduction, perhaps
more of a reduction than the supermarket stores would find profita-
ble to make. While a predator may be willing to reduce prices
slightly below the competitive level for the sake of future profits, the
losses the predator is willing to incur are strictly limited by its esti-
mate of future profits."'
The conventional store's task is made more difficult by the fact
100. See supra note 16.
101. Another factor is the efficiency of the warehouse store. The more efficient the ware-
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that it must attract more customers to eliminate the warehouse
store than the warehouse store would have to retain in order to re-
main a viable competitor. 102 As these sales are (by assumption) be-
ing made at a loss, the conventional store's losses during the price
war will probably exceed the warehouse store's losses. Therefore,
even if a predatory pricing strategy held out the prospect of great
long-run gains for the conventional store, the conventional store
may also have to incur great losses in order to achieve those gains.
Some writers have argued that a predator will never "outbid" an
entrant by suffering short-term losses in the hopes of acquiring a
future monopoly.10 3 The argument is that if the established firm
could acquire a monopoly by driving out the entrant, the entrant
could also acquire a monopoly by driving out the established
firm." Both firms then have the same chance of future monopoly
profits, so if they have equal access to capital, each should be willing
to incur the same amount of losses in pursuit of those profits.105
This argument may not apply to the retail food market because
the market is not perfectly homogeneous. While a conventional
store may be able to drive a warehouse store out of business en-
tirely, the warehouse store may not be able to completely eliminate
the conventional store if there are some consumers who prefer the
full-service format, even at a higher price. In that case, conven-
tional supermarkets and warehouse stores are not competing for the
same stream of future profits, and it is conceivable that the future
profits available to the traditional store are greater than those avail-
able to the warehouse store. Of course, the opposite result is also
possible. If the warehouse store has significantly lower costs than
the conventional stores, the warehouse store has the largest poten-
tial stream of future profits, so it may have the strongest incentive to
stay in the market.
In addition, the assumption of equal access to capital may not
apply. The most vocal complainants about alleged predation are
usually the independent warehouse stores, who claim to have fewer
house store is, the harder it will be for the predator to force the warehouse store from the
market.
102. R. BORK, supra note 22, at 149-52. This assumes that the minimum efficient scale
for a warehouse store is sufficiently small that the store can stay in business while serving less
than 50% of the local market. With that assumption, to drive the warehouse store out of
business, the predators would have to be willing to sell to more than 50% of the market.
103. See Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 268-70 (arguing that a predator will never outbid
an entrant by suffering short-term losses).
104. Id.
105. Id.
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resources available to overcome predation attempts. Without trying
to resolve the entire debate about the perfection of capital mar-
kets, 0 6 we can at least say that individual entrants may have lim-
ited access to funds. A supermarket chain with deep pockets might
therefore be able to eliminate such entrants.
2. Will Predation Lead to Future Profits?
The preceding analysis rested on the assumption that if a con-
ventional store succeeded in eliminating a warehouse store, it could
look forward to future monopoly profits. This would be true only if
the conventional store has a monopoly in the relevant market"0 7
and if the market is protected by some form of entry barrier which
would give the conventional store time to enjoy the monopoly prof-
its. If the conventional store must always be fighting off entrants
with predatory price cuts it would always be suffering losses and
would never earn the compensating profits.
Thus, a "deep pocket" does not by itself make predatory pricing
an attractive strategy because even if it eliminated, at substantial
cost, an underfinanced entrant, the predator would still be subject
to entry by stronger and better-financed stores. Many warehouse
stores are operated by well-established food chains, and other
chains have announced their intention to enter the warehouse seg-
ment. 0 8 Indeed, the fact that conventional supermarkets have
made the same price-cutting response to the entry of chain-owned
warehouse stores as they have to the entry of independent ware-
house stores'0 9 casts serious doubt on the "deep pocket" theory as
an explanation for the price cuts. Without some additional barrier
to entry to protect long-term profits, "deep pocket" predation is un-
likely to be a profitable strategy in this industry.
In fact, barriers to entry into the grocery business are relatively
low compared to barriers in most other industries. 1 0 For example,
106. See, e.g., F. SCHERER, supra note 45, at 104-08.
107. The same analysis applies to an oligopoly in which the firms managed to cooperate
perfectly, or even to an oligopoly in which the firms manage some less effective degree of
cooperation. Whenever we speak of a "monopolist" in this Section, this qualification should
be understood.
108. See supra note 33.
109. See Allvine, supra note 8. The Allvine study showed that the incumbent stores re-
sponded with the same price cuts to the entry of warehouse stores owned by the Food Giant
chain as they did to the entry of warehouse stores owned by a smaller, warehouse-only
operation.
110. See In re Grand Union Co., 102 F.T.C. 812, 857-59 (1983). In 1983, the average
cost of a new supermarket was less than $1.5 million and the time lag from construction to
break-even was approximately 12 months. Food Marketing Institute, 1983 Facts About Store
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the principle economy of scale in the grocery business involves the
cost of a centralized warehouse to serve all of one chain's stores in a
single metropolitan area. However, in most areas there are in-
dependent contractors who can supply warehouse services to unaf-
filiated stores. While there may be other economies of scale
connected with newspaper advertising and site selection, these ap-
pear to be relatively modest as compared to economies of scale in
many other industries.l1 ' Similarly, while there may be some con-
sumer loyalties which a new store must overcome, they are not
comparable to the brand loyalties associated with other, more heav-
ily advertised consumer products. '1 2
Of course, this analysis does not imply that barriers to entry are
so negligible that there is no possibility of anticompetitive practices
in the grocery industry. Cases of collusion or anticompetitive merg-
ers, for example, could still raise antitrust concerns. Predation,
however, is a much more expensive method of cartelizing an indus-
try than is merger or collusion, and will usually require much
stronger barriers to entry to make predation a profitable long-run
strategy. Such barriers do not appear to be present in the retail
grocery industry.
Indeed, the warehouse store segment may be even easier to enter
than the conventional supermarket segment. Certainly, the rapid
growth of warehouse stores in a number of markets seems to sup-
port the proposition that the barriers to entry are low. While data
on entry costs is difficult to obtain, the opinion of the trade press
seems to be that, "like the warehouse store, the box store may be a
tempting format for retailers to try because of the relatively low
start-up costs . ..[t]he cost of failure in these two store formats is
much lower than in others." '113 In short, while it is impossible to
Development 1, 9 (1983). While comparable cost figures were not available for warehouse
stores, the average time lag from construction to break-even for warehouse stores was only six
months. Id.
I11. MARION, supra note 8, at 26-27. The authors of that study identify store loyalty and
the scale economies associated with newspaper advertising and central warehousing as the
principal barriers to entry. However, they offer no evidence that these barriers are particu-
larly high as compared to similar barriers in most other industries. Moreover, they also
conclude that entry is "virtually unrestricted for independent entrepreneurs who operate one
or two stores and are affiliated with a viable, voluntary or cooperative wholesaler." Id. at 26.
This is precisely the position of many warehouse stores.
112. Id.
113. Inventory of Formats: Capsule Reports Update Status of Grocery Stores from Box to
Super, ADVERTISING AGE, Apr. 27, 1981, at S-2. The article drew a distinction between
"box" and "warehouse" stores, defining the latter as the more extreme form of no-frills oper-
ation. This distinction is not important for purposes of this article.
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prove that "deep pocket" predation will never be profitable, it is
likely to be extremely rare in the retail grocery market.1 4
3. Predatory Threats
If an established conventional supermarket could successfully
convince all potential entrants that it would charge a predatory
price, the preceding analysis would not apply. If the potential en-
trants believe that the conventional store will carry out this threat,
the anticipated losses would make entry unprofitable, and the en-
trants would choose not to enter. As long as potential entrants al-
ways chose not to enter, the conventional store would never have to
enact its unprofitable predatory price cuts, so its strategy of making
threats would be highly profitable.
The major problem with this strategy is that potential entrants
are not likely to believe a threat if they know it would be unprofit-
able for the established store to carry through with the price cuts.
However, this objection is less forceful if potential entrants are un-
certain whether price cuts sufficient to deter entry would be profit-
able for the conventional stores. The following analysis therefore
considers some pricing strategies designed to convince potential en-
trants that they are likely to meet with predatory pricing upon
entry.
B. Predation Against an Uncertain Entrant
Economic analysis often assumes that all actors have perfect in-
formation about relevant cost and demand conditions. This as-
sumption is merely a convenient fiction, but it makes analysis much
simpler and does not greatly affect the qualitative results. In bar-
gaining and strategy contexts, however, the extent of each party's
knowledge about others' costs and opportunities can have an impor-
tant effect on the outcome.
1. Possible Sources of Uncertainty
Early predation theorists usually assumed that the entrant knew
with certainty that predatory pricing would not be a profitable strat-
114. It should be noted that most empirical inquiries into actual predatory pricing cases
have found few, if any, confirmed instances of deep-pocket predation. McGee, supra note I;
Zerbe & Cooper, supra note 4; Koller, The Myth of Predatory Pricing: An Empirical Study, 4
ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 105 (1971); Elzinga, Predatory Pricing: The Case of the Gun-
powder Trust, 13 J.L. & ECON. 223 (1970); Zerbe, The American Sugar Refinery Company, 12
J.L. & ECON. 339 (1969). But see Yamey, Predatory Price Cutting: Notes and Comments, 15
J.L. & EcON. 129, 137-42 (1972).
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egy for the incumbent firm." 5 Uncertainty was introduced into the
model by making potential entrants unsure whether the incumbent
would act irrationally and engage in predatory pricing even though
the incumbent as well as the entrant would be hurt by such a
move.116 In other bargaining contexts, such as foreign policy nego-
tiations, a player may gain from convincing an opponent that he
would react irrationally if the opponent made a threatening
move." 7 Actually enacting the price cuts in the event of entry
might then be rational, because the price cuts would help convince
future entrants that the incumbent would in fact behave
"irrationally."
Without introducing irrationality into the model, threats could
also be successful if the entrant does not know how far it would be
profitable for competitive supermarkets to reduce their prices in re-
sponse to entry. As Sections II and III described, the size of the
competitive loss-minimizing price cut depends on such factors as
the incumbents' cost curves, the size of market demand, and the
amount of excess capacity that would result from entry. In some
markets, the competitive price cut defined by these parameters
would still allow profitable entry by warehouse stores; in others,
entry by a warehouse store would not be profitable. In most cases,
an entering warehouse store will not be absolutely certain about the
profitability of the market it proposes to enter.
This uncertainty can create an incentive for predatory and
otherwise unprofitable price cuts. This is because the pricing strat-
egy used by an incumbent supermarket may be one piece of infor-
mation affecting the entering warehouse store's estimate of true
market conditions. The most extreme case provides the clearest il-
lustration. Suppose that the warehouse store believes that a super-
market would never reduce prices below the competitive, loss-
minimizing level.1" 8 Then, if the supermarket reduces its price to a
level that would make entry unprofitable, the warehouse store will
conclude that market conditions are less favorable than anticipated,
and the decision to enter was a bad one. But if warehouse stores
115. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 21, at 185-86; Williamson, supra note 26, YALE L.J.
at 286-87; F. SCHERER, supra, note 45, at 338-39. A useful survey of recent technical litera-
ture is contained in Dixit, Recent Developments in Oligopoly Theory, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 12
(May, 1982, papers & proceedings).
116. Id.
117. T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 207-29 (1960).
118. This example is taken from Salop, Introduction, in STRATEGIC PREDATION AND
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS (S. Salop ed. 1981) [hereinafter referred to as STRATEGIC
PREDATION].
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always react in this way, a supermarket might find it profitable to
price below the true competitive level in a market in which entry
was in fact profitable, in order to mislead the warehouse store as to
the market's true profitability.
In practice, the situation is more complex. All but the most
naive entrants will realize that there is a chance of being misled in
this manner, so they will not automatically conclude that a low
post-entry price indicates unfavorable demand or supply conditions.
If entrants are aware of the possibility that the incumbent firm(s)
might set a deliberatively misleading price, the analysis quickly be-
comes complicated by the "what if he knows that I know that he
knows" sort of issue that complicates much of game theory. Never-
theless, the possibility that predatory price cuts might be a rational
strategy for the incumbent cannot be ruled out on purely theoretical
grounds. Recent theories have shown that even when the entrant is
perfectly aware of the conditions under which incumbents would
try to disguise market conditions by making otherwise unprofitable
price cuts, such price cuts can still be a rational and successful
strategy." 9
2. The Effect of Uncertainty on Exit and Entry Decisions
These theories also suggest that predation need not be designed
to force the warehouse store out of the neighborhood in which the
price cuts take place. Instead, it may be designed to mislead the
warehouse store into cancelling plans to expand into neighboring
markets. If the warehouse store has not yet made investments in
those markets, it can revise its expansion plans whenever it appears
that prices in those markets will fall to a level too low to permit
recovery of the warehouse store's total costs. Therefore, if the su-
permarket's response to entry in the initial market makes the supply
and demand conditions seem less favorable than the entrant first
believed, a warehouse store that was willing to enter the initial mar-
ket may be unwilling to expand.
This strategy of deterring future expansion would be pointless
unless the supermarket has stores to protect in other markets.
119. See Kreps & Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information, 27 J. ECON. THEORY
253 (1982); Milgrom & Roberts, Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence, 27 J. ECON.
THEORY 280 (1982). See also Milgrom & Roberts, Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete
Information: An Equilibrium Analysis, 50 ECONOMETRICA 443 (1982); Rosenthal, Games of
Perfect Information, Predatory Pricing, and the Chain-Store Paradox, 25 J. ECON. THEORY 92
(1981); Kreps & Wilson, On the Chain-Store Paradox and Predation: Reputation for Tough-
ness, IMSS Technical Report No. 317, Stanford University (1980); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
PREDATION: THE "NOisy" PRICING STRATEGY (1980).
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However, this condition is satisfied in most instances of alleged pre-
dation by supermarket chains. Professor Easterbrook has noted
that entry-deterring predation might still be unprofitable if the en-
trant were to enter all the markets simultaneously, leaving no re-
maining markets into which predation could deter expansion.
120 If
the entrant faces some uncertainty about the market's supply and
demand conditions, though, simultaneous entry into all markets
may be too risky to be a realistic option. Experience indicates that
most warehouse stores seem to enter one or two neighborhoods at a
time, "testing the waters" before deciding whether to expand to ad-
ditional locations in a given metropolitan area.
3. Structural Requirements for Reputational Predation
The possibility of using predatory price reductions to deter ex-
pansion into adjacent markets means that firms without any pros-
pect of earning monopoly profits could still have an incentive for
predation. This point is often overlooked, perhaps because most
predation theories focus on the case of a firm which makes preda-
tory price cuts in order to gain future monopoly profits. 121 Preda-
tion, however, could also be profitable for a competitive firm if it
deterred a warehouse store's entry into adjacent markets, and thus
avoided the losses that entry would otherwise inflict on the conven-
tional store. From the point of view of a potential predator, the
differences between a loss and a normal rate of return should be just
as much of an incentive as the difference between a normal rate of
return and a stream of monopoly profits. If the latter is sufficient to
make predation worthwhile, then the former would also be
sufficient.
Therefore, a monopoly in the traditional sense is not absolutely
necessary to make a predatory strategy profitable. However, the
profitability of predation is still influenced by the market's struc-
tural characteristics, so these characteristics can still be used as a
rough guide to estimate a supermarket's incentives for predation.
In fact, the structural factors needed to make this form of predation
profitable are very similar to those discussed in connection with
"deep pocket" predation. 12
2
a. Market Share. One factor that bears on the profitability of
predation is the size of the losses the supermarkets would have to
120. Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 286-88.
121. See supra note 16.
122. See supra notes 100-14 and accompanying text.
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incur in order to force prices down to the entry-deterring level. It is
not enough for the incumbent simply to announce its willingness to
sell at the entry-deterring price. It must also have the capacity (or
be prepared to build to such a capacity) needed to meet the market
demand at that price. Usually, this will be possible only if the
predator already has a large share of the market.
Of course, even firms with small market shares may successfully
institute predatory pricing if they act in concert to lower prices,
thus sharing the short-term losses among themselves. If perfect col-
lusion were possible, then four firms, each with a twenty percent
share, could use predatory pricing as effectively as one firm with an
eighty percent share. However, reaching an agreement on a joint
predation strategy is much more difficult than the more traditional
task of reaching agreement on a cartel price. The gains from preda-
tion are more speculative and the potential collaborators are more
likely to disagree about whether it is worthwhile to risk the short-
term losses that a predatory strategy would impose on them. This
is particularly true when the main purpose of predation is to deter
entry into other markets in which some collaborators have large
interests and others have little or no interest.
b. Entry Hurdles. Another factor that bears on the profitabil-
ity of predation is the level to which a price must fall in order to
convince a potential entrant not to enter a new market. In general,
this factor depends on how long the lower price will be sustained
and on how much the entrant has to risk in order to enter that
market. 1
23
The latter is a function of entry hurdles, the costs an entrant
must incur that cannot be recovered if it later exits. 124 If there were
no sunk costs to entry, so an entrant could exit at any time and
recover the full amount of his investment, then entry would be a
123. Milgrom & Roberts, Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An
Equilibrium Analysis, 50 ECONOMETRICA 443 (1982).
124. Ordover & Willig, supra note 20, at 11-12. See also Baumol & Willig, Fixed Costs,
Sunk Costs, Entry Barriers, and Sustainability of Monopoly, 96 Q.J. ECON. 405 (1981). These
are not entry barriers in the Stiglerian sense of a cost that only has to be borne by entrants.
See G. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67 (1968). Incumbent supermarkets
may have had to incur the same costs when they entered. However, this results in a differ-
ence between the incumbent and entrant, for the incumbent will have already incurred those
costs, while the potential entrant is still deciding whether to make the investment. This is
what permits entry-deterring strategies: the entrant can still be deterred from making its
investment while the incumbent (which has already made its investment) cannot.
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virtually riskless proposition. 25 An entrant would then be willing
to enter additional markets even if the likelihood of a predatory re-
sponse was very high, on the chance that this might be the one time
the incumbent firm decides against predation. If the incumbent re-
sponds to entry with predatory pricing, the entrant can exit the
market without cost. If there is no predatory response, the entrant
would realize all the gains of successful entry.
Of course, few markets meet this ideal of full reversibility of en-
try. There is always some sunk cost in terms of lost time and effort
involved in planning the entry. There may also be other costs, such
as advertising and depreciation, that can never be fully recovered.
As industries go, however, the sunk costs required to enter retail
grocery business appear to be low, with entry by means of the ware-
house format the least costly. 126 Consequently, deeper and longerprice cuts will be required to deter the expansion of a warehouse
store than would be required to deter expansion in most other in-
dustries. The greater the price reduction that is required, the more
costly a predatory price-cutting strategy will be.
c. Traditional Barriers to Entry. While barriers to entry in the
more traditional sense may not be absolutely necessary to this form
of reputational predation, they still make predation a more attrac-
tive strategy. Recent experiments appear to confirm this prediction:
sunk costs alone, in the absence of traditional entry barriers, were
insufficient to eliminate the threat of entry as a check on monopoly
pricing.12
7
The difficulty with relying solely on the threat of predation to
deter entry is that the apprehension created by the predatory pric-
ing may not survive long or be accepted by all potential entrants.
Market conditions are constantly changing and each potential en-
trant has a different estimate of its ability to succeed in a given mar-
ket. Without other barriers to entry, then, the predatory "lesson"
125. Baumol, Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure, 72
AM. ECON. REv. 14 (1982).
126. See supra notes 111-13.
127. Coursey, Isaac, Luke & Smith, Market Contestability in the Presence of Sunk (Entry)
Costs, 15 RAND J. ECON. 69 (1984). However, these experiments did show that the presence
of sunk costs occasionally permitted prices to rise slightly above the levels observed in mar-
kets where sunk costs were not required as a condition of entry. Id. at 80. See also Coursey,
Isaac & Smith, Natural Monopoly and Contested Markcs: Some Experimental Results, 27
J.L. & ECON. 91 (1984) (when entry was costless, experimental markets all behaved
competitively).
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may have to be repeated fairly frequently. The need for such repeti-
tions greatly reduces the profitability of a predatory strategy.
4. Predatory Intent
It should now be clear why the distinction between predatory
pricing and ordinary competition is so difficult to make. As the
previous sections have shown, it is not absolutely necessary for the
predator to have monopoly profits or to be protected by traditional
barriers to entry for predation to be profitable. Even in the case of
protected monopolies, predation can be profitable without the en-
trant's extinction. The purpose of predation may simply be to deter
future expansion, in which case the only observable result of the
predation would be the entrant's failure to enter other markets.
This outcome, however, is no different than the outcome in a situa-
tion where expansion into other markets did not take place for
other reasons, such as the inability of other markets to support a
warehouse store. The difficulty of distinguishing these situations
may explain why there are no empirical studies of predatory pric-
ing cases which test for this form of predation.
In theory, it may be possible to test for predation designed to
deter future expansion by examining the factors the defendant su-
permarket took into account in making its pricing decision. The
competitive pricing strategies described in Section II are calculated
by looking only at the market in which entry actually occurs, while
the predatory strategy discussed in this section requires a balancing
of the losses in that market against the gains to be had or the losses
to be avoided in other markets. However, this test is extremely un-
reliable, for even the competitive pricing strategy can have an effect
on the entrant's future expansion plans.' 28 While this effect should
not have any bearing on the incumbent store if the incumbent is
pricing competitively, it is hard to imagine that the store would not
be aware of that effect and, the effect will surely be mentioned in
internal corporate debates. 12 9 All of the other problems of relying
on internal memoranda as evidence of corporate intent-for exam-
ple, the incentive this creates for destruction of documents, or the
advantage this gives to well-counseled firms who can create the ap-
128. See supra notes 38-71 and accompanying text.
129. As Professor Porter has pointed out, most modern firms regularly consider the ef-
fects of their conduct on their competitors' strategies. Porter, Strategic Interactions: Some
Lessons from Industry Histories for Theory and Antitrust Policy, in STRATEGIC PREDATION,
supra note 118.
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propriate paper record-are also relevant here. 3'
V. CONCLUSION
In light of the numerous complaints about price wars in the gro-
cery industry, 13  our conclusion that predatory pricing is not a
problem may seem incongruous. However, complaints about price
cuts are often heard in competitive industries where entry is easy
and prices are flexible, particularly if the industry is in the process
of adjusting from one equilibrium to another. The grocery industry
is not like the steel or automobile industries, where prices change at
infrequent intervals. Instead, prices in the grocery industry have
historically been extremely volatile.1 32 But this volatility is surely a
sign of competitive vigor and not an indication that the industry is
monopolized. If the legal system allows itself to be influenced by
the number and volume of competitor's complaints, it will end up
scrutinizing price cuts most closely in the very industries where
such scrutiny is least needed.
We are not asserting that socially harmful predation is impossi-
ble among retail grocers. Our argument is simply that the costs of
trying to prohibit such predation are almost certain to outweigh any
potential gains. The costs stem from the impossibility of designing
a legal standard that would prohibit predatory price cuts without
restricting the competitive price cuts that are necessary to enable a
market to move from one equilibrium to another. While a recover-
able cost standard can perform that function in theory, in practice
the number of adjustments required to apply such a standard to
multiproduct retailers makes it a very crude standard at best.
In contrast to the difficulty of applying a recoverable costs stan-
dard, conclusions based on the grocery industry's structure are rela-
tively easy to draw. By virtually any criteria-the height of barriers
to entry, the level of market concentration, the extent of irreversible
costs, or the stability of potential monopoly gains-retail grocery
markets do not appear to be likely candidates for successful preda-
tion. In fact, if all the industries in the country were ranked accord-
130. R. POSNER, supra note 21, at 189-90.
131. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
132. Price wars among retail groceries were observed long before warehouse stores be-
came popular, and they continue to exist in markets without warehouse stores. E.g., Miss,
Price War Pulls Shoppers From 12 Counties, 3 Other States, SUPERMARKET NEWS, Mar. 21,
1983, at 1; Hot Quebec Price War Goes Into Third Week, SUPERMARKET NEWS, Mar. 14,
1983, at 1; The Superpower Supermarkets Go To War- Again, Boston Globe, June 15, 1982,
at 33.
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ing to their susceptibility to predation, including heavy
manufacturing industries with large fixed investments in capacity,
and consumer goods that require large investments in brand loyalty,
the retail grocery industry would be near the bottom of the list.
Within the retail grocery industry, the warehouse store format
would probably rank lowest of all.
Thus, there is little need for a rule requiring supermarkets to
justify in court their price cuts against some form of price-cost stan-
dard. The costs of litigating the application of such a standard and
the uncertainty of the outcome could deter competitive supermar-
kets from reducing prices, 133 resulting in clear social losses, and
there is no real likelihood of corresponding gains. Even Professor
Areeda, one of the leading proponents of a variable cost standard,
has recently recognized as much.134 While adhering to a variable
cost test as the best standard for most cases, he would specifically
except any industry that could easily be shown to be an unlikely
locus of long-term monopoly power, and in which a variable cost
standard would be extremely difficult to apply. Significantly, he
identifies retail distribution as one example of such an industry. 35
Obviously, one case study cannot determine the best approach
to predatory pricing charges in all industries. In some industries, it
may be very easy to apply a recoverable cost standard and very diffi-
cult to evaluate the market's structural characteristics, in which
case our recommended approach would be the opposite of that rec-
ommended for the retail grocery industry. Certainly, the structural
characteristics in other industries will not always be as clear as they
are in the retail grocery business, although the difficulties of apply-
ing a recoverable cost standard may often be just as great.' 36
All our study suggests is that if there is to be a predatory pricing
standard, courts should be sensitive to both of the following pos-
sibilities. If a case can easily be dismissed on price-cost grounds, or
the "bad conduct" element of a monopolization charge, then it
clearly should be dismissed. If it can be easily dismissed on struc-
tural grounds, for lack of market power or lack of a "dangerous
133. See Calfee & Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Stan-
dards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984); Craswell & Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Stan-
dards (Sept. 1985) (unpublished manuscript on file at Case Western Reserve Law Review).
134. P. AREEDA, supra note 18, at 133.
135. Id. at 123-33.
136. See, e.g., In re General Foods Corp., 103 F.T.C. 204, 288-90 (1984) (discussing the
difficulties of applying a variable cost standard to a heavily advertised consumer product).
The difficulties of applying a price-cost standard have been used to argue for a blanket rule of
per se legality for all price-cutting. Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 334-37.
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probability of success," then it also should be dismissed. That is, if
one approach leads to a clear result, there is no need to subject firms
to the uncertainty and legal expense of being scrutinized under the
other approach as well. Presently, however, the question of which
approach is the easiest can only be answered on a case-by-case basis.
